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Architectures for the Future Networks and the Next Generation Internet: A Survey

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Abstract: Networking research funding agencies in the USA, Europe, Japan, and other countries are encouraging research on revolutionary networking architectures that may or may not be bound by the restrictions of the current TCP/IP based Internet. We present a comprehensive survey of such research projects and activities. The topics covered include various testbeds for experimentations for new architectures, new security mechanisms, content delivery mechanisms, management and control frameworks, service architectures, and routing mechanisms. Delay/Disruption tolerant networks, which allow communications even when complete end-to-end path is not available, are also discussed.

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Architectures for the Future Networks and the Next Generation Internet: A Survey

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Abstract

Networking research funding agencies in USA, Europe, Japan, and other countries are encouraging research on revolutionary networking architectures that may or may not be bound by the restrictions of the current TCP/IP based Internet. We present a comprehensive survey of such research projects and activities. The topics covered include various testbeds for experimentations for new architectures, new security mechanisms, content delivery mechanisms, management and control frameworks, service architectures, and routing mechanisms. Delay/Disruption tolerant networks which allow communications even when complete end-to-end path is not available are also discussed.

Keywords: Future Internet Design, FIND, Future Network Architecture, Next Generation Internet, Internet 3.0, Global Environment for Networking Innovations, GENI

1. Introduction

The Internet has evolved from being an academic pursuit to a huge commercial commodity. The IP thin waist, attributed to the simplicity of the present design has been a remarkable architectural choice motivated by the need to converge multiple link layer technologies and end-to-end transport mechanisms. However, the assumptions under which the original Internet was designed have changed. Newer contexts and specific requirements have subjected the original design paradigms of the Internet to a lot of abuse. Owing to the limitations of the underlying architecture, such overlaid hacks have limited effectiveness and are often highly inefficient.

Commercialization of the Internet has introduced concerns about security, trust, and value added services. Introduction of network-able wireless systems has forced the paradigm of mobility. Use of the Internet as a communication commodity driving the needs of business communications has raised the need for better resilience and fault-tolerance

through fine grained control and management. Best effort delivery model of IP is no longer considered adequate. Routing is no longer based on algorithmic optimization but has to deal with policy compliance. Assumptions about persistently connected end systems do not hold with the introduction of delay tolerant networking paradigms. Protocols designed without concern for energy efficiency cannot integrate energy conscious embedded system networks like sensor networks. Initial projections about the scale of the Internet have long since been invalidated leading to a current situation of IP address scarcity, BGP table growth etc. Such and numerous other needs, as a result of wide scale proliferation and service diversification of the Internet have led to forceful “plumbing-in” of external architectural artifacts into the core design. Such plumbing-in is not seamless, marring the simplicity of the IP design and introducing numerous side effects.

Several of the most relevant and immediate problems that the current Internet design has failed to provide a satisfactory solution has been discussed in [60].

Over the years, networking research has introduced newer protocols and newer architectural designs. However, as already said, the Internet is its own worst adversary. It has not been possible to in-

roduce any major changes to the deployed base of the Internet. Small and incremental changes, solving the current problems have introduced scores of others. The myopic view of incremental approaches has arguably stretched the current design to the maximum. Beyond this, and to cater to the needs of the future, the Internet has to be extended. It has to be redesigned for the present requirements, at the same time ensuring enough flexibility to adequately incorporate future requirements.

A new paradigm of architectural design thought of “Clean Slate Design” is being touted against the more traditional approach of incremental design. The theme of “Clean Slate” design is to design the system from scratch without being restrained by the constraints of the existing deployed system, providing a chance to have an unbiased look at the problem space. However, the scale of the current Internet forbids any changes and it is extremely difficult to convince the stake-holders to believe in a clean-slate design and adopt it. There is simply too much risk involved in the process. The only way to mitigate such risks and to appeal to stake holders is through actual Internet-scale validation of such designs showing their superiority over the existing systems. Fortunately, the research funding agencies all over the world have realized this pressing need and a world-wide effort to develop the next generation Internet is being carried out in full throttle. The National Science Foundation (NSF) was amongst the first to announce a GENI (Global Environment for Networking Innovations) program for developing an infrastructure for developing and testing futuristic networking ideas developed as part of its FIND (Future Internet Design) program. The NSF effort was followed suit by the FIRE (Future Internet Research and Experimentation) program supporting numerous next generation networking projects under the 7th Framework Program of the European Union, the AKARI program in Japan and several other similar specialized programs in China, Australia, Korea, and several other parts of the world.

The scale of the research efforts to develop a next generation Internet bears proof to the importance of the Internet and the need for its improvement to sustain the requirements of the future. However, the amount of work being done or proposed may really baffle someone trying to get a comprehensive view of the major research areas. In this paper, it is our goal to help fathom the diversity of these research efforts by presenting a coherent model of the

research areas and introducing some of the key research projects in these areas. However, this paper does not claim to be a comprehensive review of all the next generation Internet projects but may be considered as an introductory treatise on the broad aspects and some related proposed solutions.

Next generation Internet research efforts can be classified under the primary functions of a networking context such as routing, content delivery, management and control, security and so on. In Section 2 we argue against such an organization of the research efforts with the view that this organization is contrary to the clean-slate design thought. We present Internet 3.0 as an example of a truly clean-slate fundamental architectural framework that does not aim at optimizing one particular function but addresses the holistic issue of networking in the future. We then survey some of the more progressive and interesting ideas in smaller and more independent research areas and classify them in various sections as follows:

1. Security: In the current Internet, security mechanisms are placed as additional overlay on top of the original architecture instead of as part of the Internet architecture, which leads to a lot of problems. In this section, several new propositions and on-going research efforts that address the problems of security from a different perspective are analyzed and discussed. This includes proposals and projects related to security policies, trust relationships, names and identities, cryptography, anti-spam, anti-attacks, and privacy, etc.
2. Content Delivery Mechanisms: This section deals with research on new mechanisms for content delivery over the Internet. The next generation Internet is set to see a huge growth in the amount of content delivered over the Internet and requires robust and scalable methods to prepare for it. Also, newer paradigms of networking with content delivery as the centre of the architecture rather than connectivity between hosts as in the current architecture is discussed.
3. Delay Tolerant Networking: The original assumption of all routers along the end-to-end path being up is no longer valid particularly in environments with extremely long paths. This has led to new research in the area of disruption tolerant and delay tolerant networking (DTN). This discussion is followed by a discus-

sion of how some of the ideas of DTN can be used to make the future Internet energy efficient and to support intermittently connected mobile hosts.

4. **Management and Control Framework:** The current Internet works on a retro-fitted management and control framework that does not provide efficient management and troubleshooting. The proposals for the future Internet in this area vary from completely centralized ideas of management to more scalable and distributed ideas. The discussions in this section relate to the issues of management and control in the current Internet and some of the proposals for the future.
5. **Service Architectures:** The commercial usage of Internet, the ubiquitous and heterogeneous environments, and security and management challenges require the next generation Internet to provide a broad range of services that go far beyond the simple store-and-forward paradigm of the today's Internet. In this section, several proposals on designing next generation service architecture are discussed. Key design goals for next generation service architecture include flexibility and adaptability, avoiding the ossification of the current Internet, and facilitating mapping the user-level service requirements into the lower infrastructure layers.
6. **Routing:** This section is mainly dedicated to novel and futuristic proposals addressing the routing problem. While some proposals try to address the immediate concerns with IP based routing, others are more futuristic and propose fundamental changes to the routing paradigm.
7. **Future Internet Infrastructure Design for Experimentation:** This section discusses the various efforts to develop testbed architectures that can support the research needs to next generation proposals. Two basic ideas are those of: (1) **Virtualization:** providing isolation and sharing of substrate experimental resources including routers, switches and end hosts, and (2) **Federation:** providing realistic and large scale testing environments through federation of multiple diverse testbeds designed to represent diverse contexts.

2. Internet 3.0

The Internet 3.0 project at Washington University in Saint Louis is an effort to define a new archi-

tectural basis for the future Internet. Leveraging years of experience with the current Internet design and related research efforts to modify/improve it, Internet 3.0 proposes a multi-tier diversified architecture separating hosts, data, services, users and infrastructure, and establish them as individual objects such that it allows dynamically composable networking contexts according to specified fine grained policies and requirements. It deviates from the existing "one suit fits all" paradigm of the current Internet model and introduces a new paradigm of "requirement specific" networking. Internet 3.0 differs from other clean-slate next-generation Internet proposals in that it takes a holistic view of the present problems, rather than treating each of them in isolation.

Clean-slate views of isolated problems in a specific functional area do not necessarily fit together to define a seamless integrated system as a whole since they are defined under fixed assumptions about the other parts of the system. This result in the best individual solutions often contradicting each other at the system level. As an example, a clean-slate centralized management and control proposal may interfere with the objectives of a highly-scalable distributed routing mechanism, rendering both the solutions useless in the system perspective. Also, we believe that the current Internet and its success should not in any way bias "clean slate" thought and designers should be able to put in radical new ideas that may have absolutely no semblance to any design principle of the current Internet.

As already mentioned, Internet 3.0 takes a holistic view of the problem space and defines a "fundamental constraint-based diversified environment" such that a "requirement specific" networking context can be composed dynamically from a set of fundamental objects subject to some fundamental constraints. Specific protocols and functions operate within this framework to serve specific networking scenarios. The Internet 3.0 fundamental objects include user, data, services, host and infrastructure. The primary fundamental constraint on these objects can be represented by a simple dependency diagram representing the implicit dependencies among the various objects.

As shown in Fig. 1, a user, service or data cannot participate in a networking context without a direct connection to a network-able electronic host and a network-able host depends on its connection to the networking infrastructure, to be able to communi-

cate. This dependency model is common knowledge and true for any communication environment. However, the design of the current Internet treats this layered dependency model as an atomic unit for communication and defines protocols to achieve communication between two such entities. More explicitly, the current Internet is designed to conflate users, data and services to hosts and hosts to their particular point-of-presence in the infrastructure. Internet 3.0 proposes to establish a de-conflated environment in which each of the fundamental objects are allowed to exist independently and define mechanisms to dynamically compose them to valid networking contexts. The scope of this dynamic composition should also allow dynamic re-compositions in case a particular context is rendered invalid at a certain point within the communication process.




Figure 1: Object Dependency in Internet 3.0

Object independence entails the need for independent object naming and for defining management and policy enforcement boundaries. PONA [143] is a sub-project of Internet 3.0 that proposes a policy oriented naming architecture. PONA proposes logical aggregation of objects under common trust, security and administrative policies to form “realms”. Thus, data objects belong to their data realm, users belong to user realms, hosts belong to the host realm and so on. Fig 2, which extends the dependency graph of Fig. 1 presents this idea. The aggregation enforced by the concept of realms is purely logical and enforced by special objects called realm managers.

Objects are named in the context of their specific realms and each object is allowed to belong to multiple realms. A networking context composed of objects from various realms is valid only if they do have a conflict-free policy subset. Also, the realm managers act as anchor points for objects and provide services such as (1) object registry maintaining object capabilities, (2) object negotiation agent for leasing objects for a particular application, (3) object authentication, authorization and accounting functions, (4) trusted delegation

points of objects, (5) home agents for object mobility and so on. These functions resemble the role of a middle-box in the current Internet, however unlike middle-boxes, realm managers are legitimate members defined within the architecture thus allowing enhanced functionality and fine-grained control. Realms are hierarchical with naming of the realms representing this hierarchy to allow Internet-scale deployability.




Figure 2: Organization of Objects in Internet 3.0

PONA lays down the basic organization of objects. As is obvious from the organization, PONA enables separate ownership for each object subject to specific owner-specified policies. The primary challenge, however, is to form a desired networking context from these objects. Preposterous as it may seem, it is not far from reality. Ubiquity of the infrastructure points-of-attachments through huge advances of wireless broadband technologies lay the foundation of a future where local processing and storage shall be seamlessly moved to the Internet cloud. In such a context, imagine a use case scenario where a user entrusts a host-leasing service provider with storing his data and provide processing power on behalf of the user when required. At some point of time, the user may choose to (1) process/view his own data locally, or (2) transfer his local data to be stored in the cloud, (3) delegate data processing to the cloud, (4) transfer his data in the cloud to another user also on the cloud, and so on.

The host-leasing service provider is responsible for ensuring seamless availability of the users data notwithstanding his location or state. To guarantee timely availability of data to the user, the host-leasing provider may resort to special means, such as, (1) caching parts of data in various locations, (2) moving bulk data from one storage space location to another following user movement, (3) transferring users data to another user from the nearest copy or

copies, etc. The user should be oblivious to how the host-leasing provider achieves these functionalities to meet its service level agreement. The host leasing company may, however, have to depend on differentiated services from infrastructure providers. While infrastructure providers, such as ISP's, provide infrastructure objects and guarantees within their own administrative domains (realm), a path might need to be composed of multiple such infrastructure objects. A infrastructure-leasing service provider may provide multi-infrastructure object SLA service to the host-leasing service provider above it. This vertical hierarchy sets up an effective SLA and billing framework.

In this massively distributed scenario, the composition of an effective and valid networking scenario is set up through the collaboration of objects along the different levels of the dependency diagram hierarchy of Fig. 2. The host leasing service and infrastructure leasing service can independently define their own mechanism for content delivery, distribution, routing, naming etc. However, some common mechanisms required by these services include (1) a specification language through which the objects could advertise their capabilities, policies, costs, availability etc., (2) a brokerage mechanism that allows object brokering, and (3) a management mechanism at each level ensuring delivery of services.

The business incentives for current ISP's to allow leasing of infrastructure objects lie in the competitive pressure on ISP's by overlay systems and future overlay hosting services. However, services such as those provided by these overlay hosting services is a subset of the multi-level object composition environment discussed here. Also, inefficiency of overlay mechanisms owing to duplicacy of effort, (2) inability of underlays to provide diversified services owing to their goal of achieving global optimization of all flows, and (3) policy tussle between overlays and underlays can be avoided in Internet 3.0. Additionally, Internet 3.0 provides a much more flexible, dynamic, mobile and policy enforceable environment for future networking contexts.

The ideas described till now are clean-slate and futuristic and require significant changes to the current Internet architecture. However, progress in virtualization technologies and ubiquity of the networking environment is soon expected to demand such massive changes of the current Internet. A more immediately tangible and proof-of-concept project undertaken to design a more modest archi-

ture introducing the ideas of host and infrastructure realm is described in [140], [141] and [185]. The same concepts could be applied to solve the problems of host mobility, site multi-homing, routing scalability and trust-based security in the current Internet.

MILSA (Mobility and Multihoming supporting Identifier Locator Split Architecture) is basically designed to be an end-host based ID locator split routing architecture. MILSA has three main features. First, MILSA separates ID from locator in the end host side, and also separates trust relationships (administrative realms) from connectivity (infrastructure realms). The detailed mechanisms on how to setup and maintain this trust relationship are presented in [140]. A hierarchical identifier system allows a scalable bridging function that is placed between the host realms and the infrastructure realms. Second, the signaling and data plane functions are separated to improve the performance and support mobility. Third, to provide transparency to upper layer applications, identifier locator split happens at the network layer. A Hierarchical URI-like Identifier (HUI) is used by the upper layers and is mapped to a set of locators by the HUI Mapping Sublayer (HMS) through interaction with the bridging infrastructure.

In [141], several design enhancements for MILSA are presented including (1) a security-enabled and logically oriented hierarchical identifier system, (2) a three-level identifier resolution system, (3) a new hierarchical code based design for the locator structure, (4) cooperative mechanisms among the three planes in the MILSA model to assist mapping and routing, and (5) an integrated MILSA service model. The underlying design rationale is also discussed along with the design descriptions.

To summarize our work on MILSA and MILSA enhancements [140] [141] in which the basic MILSA architectural design and extensions were presented,

1. MILSA [140] is basically an end-host based ID locator split architecture;
2. It tries to address all the problems identified by the IRTF RRG design goals (such as: routing scalability, mobility, multihoming, and traffic engineering); actually none of the other existing solutions can address them all;
3. It avoids the Provider Independent (PI) addresses usage for global routing;
4. It implements signaling and data separation to improve performance and efficiency;

5. It introduces a new decoupled ID space that can facilitate further trust relationship, provides policy enforcements among different organizations, and supports location privacy by proxy;
6. In [141], we presented many enhancements such as secure hierarchical ID system, multiple ID resolution and mapping, multicast, many-cast, and service integration.

The RANGI project [185] uses similar locator/Identifier split ideas in the context of site multi-homing and traffic engineering. Site multi-homing in the current Internet requires the use of provider independent (PI) addresses which greatly increases the load on default-free-zone (DFZ) routers. While PI sites desire this independence of being able to choose their providers, they negatively impact the scalability of the routing infrastructure. RANGI is an effort to preserve the site interests while at the same time addressing the scalability issue. The primary idea is to assign (1) multiple provider aggregatable (PA) addresses to each host in the customer network from upstream provider address blocks, and (2) a host ID representing the logical organizational membership of the host to the customer site. Assigning PA addresses to such stub sites helps the issue of routing scalability, while sites are allowed to multi-home by employing IP re-writing techniques at the border routers. Transport connections are bound to host IDs and, thus, are not affected by address re-writing.

The RANGI mechanism is represented in Fig. 3. As an example, a stub site multi-homing to two providers, X and Y, receives two distinct PA locator prefixes or locator domain IDs (LDIDs) from the two providers. Each host in the stub site is given a permanent host ID (HID) and two locators from each PA locator prefix (LDIDX and LDIDY). The transport layer session is bound to the host ID (HID) allowing transport sessions to remain intact across locator changes. Locators in RANGI have two parts, a local part also called the local locator (LL) appended to a network PA prefix or LDID. In order to avoid link failures or for site traffic engineering, the stub site border routers may re-write the source address of a packet. In this example, the border router (BR) rewrites the network prefix of the locator (LDIDX to LDIDY) keeping the LL intact. This also allows the stub site to perform ingress traffic engineering for that particular session. RANGI, thus, motivates sites to

obtain aggregatable PA locators by allowing them the same amount of flexibility, robustness and availability that could be achieved with PI locator based multi-homing solutions.




Figure 3: RANGI: Locator re-writing

RANGI host IDs consist of (1) a hierarchical part overlaid with a hierarchical administrative structure representing logical organizational hierarchy, and (2) a flat part representing a cryptographic hash of the hierarchical part to serve as a secure identifier. Both host IDs and host locators are 128-bit long. A hierarchical DHT mechanism is used to map host IDs to 128-bit IPv6 host locators. Thus, the RANGI mechanism is compatible to legacy IPv6 applications while also allowing enhanced security, site multi-homing, traffic-engineering and routing scalability features.

Thus, the Internet 3.0 project with its futuristic ideas of a highly dynamic networking environment consisting of dynamically composed objects and its more modest proof-of-concept design of MILSA and RANGI combines a clean slate effort with more tangible and immediately deployable incremental transition path. While Internet 3.0 is unique in this sense, it is also unique in trying to view the scope of the problem more holistically than most other next generation efforts.

3. Security

The original Internet was designed in a trust-all operating environment of universities and research laboratories. However, this assumption has long since been invalidated with the commercialization of the Internet. Security has become one of the most important areas in Internet research. With more and more businesses getting online and plethora of new applications finding new uses of the Internet, security is surely going to be a major concern for the next generation. In the next

generation Internet, security shall be a part of the architecture rather than being overlaid on top of the original architecture as in the current Internet. Years of experience in security research has now established the fact that security is not a singular function of any particular layer of the protocol stack but is a combined responsibility of every principal communication function that participates in the overall communication process. In this section, we present several next generation proposals that address the problem of security from a different angle. This includes the security policies, trust relationships, names, identities, cryptography, anti-spam, anti-attacks, and privacy, etc.

3.1. Relationship-Oriented Networking

The basic goal of the Relationship-Oriented Networking project [3] is to build a network architecture that makes use of secure cryptographic identities to establish relationship among people, entities, and organizations in the Internet. It tries to provide better security, usability, and trust in the system and allows different users and institutions to build trust relationships within networks similar to what happens in the real world.

Relationship-Oriented Networking will mainly:

1. Consider how to pervasively incorporate cryptographic identities into the future network architecture.
2. Use these strong identities to establish relationships as first-class citizens within the architecture.
3. Develop an architectural framework and its constituent components that allow users and institutions to build trust relationships within the context of digital communications that can be viewed and utilized much like relationships outside the realm of digital communications.

3.1.1. Identities

The traditional Internet uses unique names to identify various resources. These names can be email addresses, account names, instant messaging IDs, etc. For example, we use the email address “user@organization.com” as the identifier for the email service. However, these identities offer little security since it can be easily spoofed. Moreover, they are invalidated after a change of service providers. To solve these problems, in the Relationship-Oriented Networking, cryptographic identities are used throughout the architecture.

These identities are more secure than the plain name-based schemes because it integrates security features in the form of keys or certificates.

3.1.2. Building and Sharing Relationships

Architecture can permit relationships to be established implicitly or explicitly. For sensitive applications with tight access control such as banking, the relationship between a bank and a patron and the patron with their account would need explicit configuration. In comparison, less sensitive services may be able to rely on less formal opportunistic relationships. For example, a public enterprise printer may need less tight access control and the relationship may be opportunistic and less formal. The relationship between people can also be built implicitly or explicitly. Similar to trust relationship formations in our society, the relationship can also be setup by “user introductions”. Also, sharing of a relationship among different people or entities is allowed which represents some degree of transitivity of the relationship. Moreover, the relationship can also be leveraged as a vote of confidence when trying to decide whether an unknown service provider is legitimate or malicious. Obviously, the sharing of the relationship should be limited by the potential downside and privacy implications.

3.1.3. Relationship Applications

Access control is one of the relationship applications. It spans from low-level access controls on the physical network infrastructure to high-level application specific control. The first level of enhanced access control comes from having stronger notions of identity because of the adoption of cryptographic-based schemes. Thus, access control can be implemented based on the users or the actors instead of rough approximations such as MAC addresses, IP addresses or DNS names. Typical examples are “Allow employee in human resource department to access the disk share that holds the personnel files” and “Allow Bob, Jane and Alice access to the shared music on my laptop”. These access control policies offer a number of benefits.

Relationships can also be used for service validation. In practice, users need to know that they are communicating with the expected service provider instead of some malicious attacker. Hence, the relationship can be used to do this job in several ways.

Relationship oriented networking also tries to build a naming system that follows the social graph to an alias resource. The resource with a name can

also be aliased in a context-sensitive way by the users. Users can expose their name to the social networks and this in turn provides ways to share information. For example, the name “babysitter” can be set in the personal namespace and expose the resource to a friend who is in need of child care. The name will be further mapped to a unique email address of a babysitter. This naming scheme allows the user a series of benefits.

In summary, relationship is a very important component of security, identity, and policy enforcement. Research in relationship oriented networking is expected to be of significant use for the future Internet. However, it is not trivial since multi-layer relationships can be extremely complex and spawn a lot of other issues such as security, identity and naming, service, access control policies, etc. Nevertheless, research in this area is expected to result in deeper insights into the nature of relationships and complexities of constructing security models around them.

3.2. Security Architecture for Networked Enterprises (SANE)

The SANE architecture [17] is designed to enhance security. The basic idea is to develop a clean-slate security architecture to protect malicious network attacks. SANE achieves this goal by requiring all the network traffic to explicitly signal their origin and their intent to the network at the outset.

With this design goal in mind, SANE includes a tailored security architecture for private networks (enterprise network) with tight policy control by using a domain controller to control the network-wide policies at a single location. For public settings, the SANE architecture requires the end-host APIs to be changed to allow the end-hosts to signal their intent to the large scale Internet.

The SANE architecture implements the network-wide policies in a central domain controller which prevents inconsistencies in network security policies by separating them from the underlying network topology. A default-off mode is also enforced in the SANE architecture which means that any host must get the permission before they can talk to other hosts, and any unauthorized transmission is disallowed at the source. Network entities are granted access to a minimum set of resources, and the information about network structure and connectivity is hidden from the end hosts. Precise control over traffic is also implemented in SANE. SANE decides

the exact paths to be taken by the network traffic and the source routes are also encrypted which helps integrate middle-boxes and application-level proxies without sacrificing security.




Figure 4: SANE Model

As shown in Fig. 4, hosts are only allowed to communicate with the domain controller by default. In step 0, through authentication, a client sets up a secure channel with the domain controller for future communication. Then in step 1, server B publishes its service, "B.http", to the network service directory. In step 2, before client A talks to client B, client A must obtain a capability for the service. Then in step 3, client A prepends the returned capability on all the packets to the correspondent. SANE offers a single protection layer for the private networks which resides between the Ethernet and IP layer. Note that all the network policies are defined and granted at the domain controller.

A possible issue with SANE could be the central control strategy which introduces a single point of failure, single point of attack and scalability problems into the architecture. There are also some additional issues that need to be solved. For example, SANE requires the switches to perform per-packet cryptographic operations to decrypt the source route which requires modifications and re-design of the switches and may slow down the data plane. Moreover, the end hosts also need to be modified to address the malicious attacks. Mechanisms to integrate the middle-box and proxies into the SANE architecture pose to be important research challenges. More detailed mechanisms and designs to address these challenges need to be presented and validated before they can be applied to the real world.

3.3. Enabling Defense and Deterrence through Private Attribution

Current network security mainly depends on defenses which are mechanisms that could impede any malicious activity. However, deterrence is also necessary to reduce the threat and attacks in the Internet. Thus, there is a requirement for a balance between defense and deterrence in the future Internet. Deterrence is usually affected by making use of an attribution which is the combination of an individual and an action. However, compared to the physical world, it is much more difficult to gain such an attribution in the Internet.

Two main design goals of this research project [167] are: 1) preserving privacy, and 2) per-packet attribution. Moreover, the security architecture provides content-based privacy assurance and tries to avoid any private information from leaking across the network. This proposal requires every packet to be self-identifying. Each packet is tagged with a unique non-forgeable label identifying the source host. The private attribution based on group signature allows the network elements to verify that a packet was sent by a member of a given group. Through the participation of a set of trusted authorities, the privacy of the individual senders can be ensured.

The per-packet attribution and the privacy preservation ensure that all the packets are authenticated and traceable. This reduces potential attacks and offers deterrence to some extent, at the same time maintains sender privacy by the use of a shared-secret key mechanism.

Some of the challenges that need to be addressed are: 1) decision regarding determining the source of the traffic in situations where traffic may be relayed by an intermediate host on behalf of the source host, 2) Tradeoff between the need for attribution security and the users' privacy, and 3) Technical details for packet transformation, overhead reduction, and guaranteeing minimum changes and impact on the existing software.

3.4. Protecting User Privacy in a Network with Ubiquitous Computing Devices

Ubiquitous presence and use of wireless computing devices has magnified the concern related to privacy [160]. This concern is inherent to the design of the link-layer and lower layer protocols and is not well addressed by the currently available approaches. In the next generation Internet, prolifera-

tion of these wireless computing devices is expected to worsen the issue of privacy.

The central problem is to devise mechanism to conceal the endpoints' information from all parties that do not need to know it for the network to function. For example, the IP addresses do not need to be revealed to all providers along the network path except for the immediate provider. Sources are assumed to trust their immediate provider more than any other transit provider on the network path. By doing this, the user's privacy can be guaranteed and it can also be manageable and accountable.

In this proposal, encrypted addresses are used to provide privacy. Entire packets including their addresses can be encrypted over links so that the identities can be hidden from other users of the network. Re-routing is also avoided in this architecture to remain efficient across the whole path.

For service discovery, cryptographic mechanisms can also be explored to protect the privacy of searches, responses, and beacons. But because of different privacy requirements, this issue is difficult to resolve. An effort is made to develop a single mechanism that can transition between these different classes of networks. Also, methods to allow the client devices to privately discover a service even when they are connected to un-trusted provider are explored.

Besides host addresses and network names, some other "implicit identifiers" can also leak information about the user's identity, and need to be concealed from untrusted parties. Moreover, the project proposes to commit in-depth research on defining communication privacy in human terms since privacy is ultimately about humans and cannot be simply delivered by the network without human interaction. Thus, the privacy scenarios and policies need to be explicitly presented to the users in order to keep them informed and the users need to be able to dictate their policy requirements as necessary.

To realize these design goals, there are several unavoidable challenges. Firstly, the names and addresses should be designed to conceal identity instead of leaking them. However, identity cannot be concealed completely since some information is needed to be understood by the network devices to accomplish certain functions. Thus, the names and addresses need to be designed carefully to conceal important information from the untrusted parties and to reveal proper information to authorized or trusted parties. Also, broadcast links such as wire-

less networks have different requirements than general wired network paths. Moreover, different layers may have bindings of the names and addresses and the identities may be revealed in multiple levels. Thus, an additional requirement is to ensure that an identity is revealed only after it is known that the binding is authorized. This new requirement forces major changes to the design in the current Internet. Managing information exposure of implicit names and identifiers and appropriate exposure of privacy are some of the major design challenges that need to be addressed.

3.5. Pervasive and Trustworthy Network and Service Infrastructures

“Trustworthy networks and service infrastructure” [27] is the name of the European Union’s Framework Program 7 (FP7) research plan on security of the future Internet. This is an umbrella project for security specific research consisting of a lot of different projects researching different aspects of network security. There are four main goals:

1. Trustworthy network infrastructure
2. Trustworthy service infrastructure
3. Technologies and tools for trustworthy networks
4. Networking, coordination and support

Most of these projects are still at their initial phases and hence not much technical details except for their initial proposals and task goals are available at this point.

The trustworthy network infrastructure research is dedicated to finding new architecture designs for future heterogeneous networks and systems which are designed with built-in security, reliability, and privacy, with secure policies across multiple domains and networks, and with trustworthy operation and management of billions of devices or “things” connected to the Internet. It also includes the research and development of trustworthy platforms for monitoring and managing malicious network threats across multiple domains or organizations. Typical E.U. FP7 projects on this topic include ECRYPT II [31] (on future encryption technologies), INTERSECTION [56] (on the vulnerabilities at the interaction point of different service providers), AWISSENET [11] (on security and error resilience on wireless ad-hoc networks and sensor networks), and SWIFT [171] (on future cross-layer identity management framework).

The second research area is to develop a secure service architecture. Secure and trustworthy service architecture is an immediate requirement to support the huge growth of Internet business applications and services. Thus, a strong need for service security properties such as reliability, availability, trust, data integrity, information confidentiality, and resilience to faults or malicious attacks is identified. To meet the various requirements, new advances in the fields of secure software engineering, modeling, and languages and tools need to be achieved. Two important research goals of this effort are the specification and validation of security properties of the service architecture and platforms, and the technologies for managing and ensuring security level in different environments. Typical projects under this research topic include MASTER [76] (managing and auditing using secure indicators), TAS3 [172] (trusted service-oriented architecture based on user-controlled data management policies), and AVANTSSAR [9] (specifying and validating the trust and security properties of service).

Technologies and tools for trustworthy network research include pro-active protection from threats in the future networks with high volume of network entities, user-centric privacy and identity management, management and assurance of security and integrity, etc. Typical E.U. projects on this topic include MOBIO [82] (on biometric technologies), ECRYPT II [31] (on cryptology), TECOM [173] (on trustable systems), and SHIELDS [164] (secure software engineering technologies).

3.6. Anti-Spam Research Group (ASRG)

There has been a substantial increase in the number of problematic e-mail, which is generally called spam. At an extreme point, spam could threaten the usability of the e-mail service. Recently, the situation is already quite severe and is getting worse.

ASRG [8] is a working group of Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) which is focusing on research on Anti-Spam technologies. ASRG investigates tools and techniques to mitigate the effects of spam. Grabbing the underlying basic characteristics of spam, this group is motivated to develop solutions and approaches that can be designed, deployed and used in the short term. To be more specific, the related work areas include potential new administrative tools and techniques, improved anti-spam tools and techniques, evaluation frameworks and measurement, and approaches that in-

volve changes to the existing applications and protocols.

Through the past decade, many anti-spam technologies have been invented to tackle the current challenges in anti-spam [7]. Typical examples include:

1. **Message Content Techniques:** This is the basic anti-spam technique and includes three categories: static filtering, adaptive filtering, and URL filtering. Static filtering is very simple that it tries to filter the spam by setting the static addresses or subject keywords. Adaptive filtering is relatively advanced in that it can adjust the filtering based on experience. A typical example is Bayesian filters. URL filtering is based on the fact that spam always contains redirecting URLs to certain websites. Software can be used to extract the URLs from the body of message and check them against a blacklist. Since URLs in the spam change too frequently, it is a hard task to maintain this blacklist and a lot of spam traps are required to collect spam. Generally, the efficiency of URL filtering ranges from 50% to 70%, and the false positive rate can be around 0.1%.
2. **Techniques Based on SMTP:** Another category of anti-spam technique makes use of the SMTP protocol. It includes timing and protocol defects technique, greylist, callbacks, and rate limits technique. Timing and protocol defects technique detects extra data in the input buffer prior to the server sending the HELO/EHLO response, thus reducing spam spreading. Greylist is effective against those spammers who use cracked PC to send spam but ineffective against spammers sending from conventional machines. The “Greylist” technique attempts to detect SMTP clients that are not true SMTP servers and do not maintain a message queue by initially deferring the incoming messages by giving a 4xx (temporary failure) response during the SMTP protocol dialogue. The “Callbacks” technique is of relatively low effectiveness because the spammers can escape this mechanism very easily. “Rate limits” technique’s basic idea is that the robot spammers always send burst of messages faster than humans and legitimate mail servers. Thus, a SMTP server can count the number of connections per client over a time window. It is obvious that the rate limiting technique is

ineffective to be considered in a real anti-spam solution; however, it is very effective against DoS (denial of service) spam.

3. **Address Management:** Address management techniques include tagged addresses, code words, disposal addresses, and DNS (domain name system) blacklists. Tagged addresses and code words are similar in that they add a second part to an existing address that is used for sorting or filtering mail instead of mail routing. A disposable address is an address that can be disabled when spam comes. A disposable address is used in situations where users need to receive emails from unknown entities that may send spam in the future. Thus, the disposable email address is revealed rather than the real email address and it is hidden from the attacks of spam bots.
4. **Network Techniques:** Network techniques include DNS blacklists, DNS validation, and HELO/EHLO pattern matching. DNS blacklists are lists of IP addresses that share an undesirable characteristic such as a history of sending spam. DNS validation techniques verify the SMTP client by comparing the proper DNS records related to it. HELO/EHLO pattern matching techniques try to look for strings with high likelihood of being a spam sender and low likelihood of being a legitimate organization or user.
5. **White-list Techniques:** White-list techniques are typically achieved by recognizing known correspondents and adding them to a whitelist. The disadvantages are that it requires users to manually maintain the list.

4. Content Distribution Mechanisms

The content distribution mechanisms of the Internet have evolved from centralized server based distribution mechanisms to the more modern distributed approaches of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) and Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. The popularity of the web, high quality content creation for dissemination and the increased bandwidth provisioned at the network edge can be credited to be some of the motivations behind this evolution. In this section, we shall retrace this evolution and try to motivate the need for future Internet research in content delivery mechanisms and introduce some very innovative proposals that are being

studied to define the future of content delivery in the Internet.

4.1. Next Generation CDN

Initially, the concept of content distribution networks was introduced to mitigate the load on central servers. Central servers could offload the responsibility of delivering high bandwidth content to CDNs. As an example, a webpage downloaded from “abc.com” would contain pictures, videos, audio and other such multimedia high bandwidth content. The central server at abc.com would serve only the basic webpage while redirecting the browser to a CDN to fetch all the multimedia content. This mechanism worked since CDN servers were networked and placed strategically in the core network and were provisioned with high bandwidth links. CDNs moved the content closer to the end-user and, thus, ensured lower delay. However, measurement of content distribution data shows that only 50 percent of the Internet traffic is served from the top 35 core networks [69]. The rest of the data distribution has a long tail and spread across 13,000 network sites in the current Internet. As a result of this skew-ness, the present state-of-art of CDNs still suffer from the “Fat file Paradox” [122, 69].

Since the data travels on the Internet almost at the speed of light, it might seem, apparently (and hence a paradox), that the distance between the source and destination should not matter. However, it turns out, that even in the absence of congestion, the “middle mile” encounters delays as a result of peering problems between transit ISP’s, DoS attacks, Link failures etc. Congestion in the intermediate routers worsens the problem. Also, neither the servers nor the clients have any control over the “middle mile”.

Also, it is projected that, with high quality content such as High Definition Television soon making its way to the Internet, the Internet would need to provision a bandwidth of 100 TB/sec in the near future[69]. The “middle-mile problem”, discussed above, shall become more pronounced in the presence of such high data volumes. To mitigate this, a new solution for highly-distributed CDNs has been proposed. These highly-distributed CDNs place servers at the edge networks, thus abolishing the “middle mile” completely. However, these CDN networks still suffer from the limitation of being able to serve only cacheable content. Also, highly distributed architectures come at the cost of increased security, management and synchronization

problems. It is quite clear that the future of CDNs shall have to serve data from distribution points as close to the clients as possible.

4.2. Next Generation P2P

Another paradigm of data distribution that has evolved over the years is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks. Initially born as a simple music sharing application Napster [123, 190], P2P networks have progressed tremendously and are responsible for a lion share of the Internet traffic today [154, 12]. The key idea is that, in P2P networks, peers (or end hosts) share content among themselves, thus abolishing the need of a central server. In doing so peers act as “servents” – servers when uploading data for other peer/peers, client when downloading data from peer/peers. An extensive survey on P2P networks can be found at [4].

The self-organizing and self-healing properties of P2P networks guarantee tremendous potential to become the predominant content distribution mechanism of the future Internet. However, a declining trend in the popularity of P2P networks is being observed over the past year or so, being challenged by the advances in streaming video technologies [124, 18]. The reason for this decline may be attributed to certain fundamental problems underlying the basic mechanisms of P2P networks.

The first problem is that bandwidth provisioning to end hosts at edge networks is generally asymmetric. The download bandwidth is far higher than the upload bandwidths. This leads to condition of instability when the number of peer-clients for a particular content far outnumber the peer-servers.

The second problem is related to dynamics of sharing. Selfish behavior is common in peers, wherein the peers want to act only as clients and never as servers. Incentive based mechanisms, controlling the download bandwidth available to a peer depending on its upload bandwidth, has been devised in modern P2P systems such as BitTorrent [125].

Finally, the third problem is the tussle of interests between P2P systems and the ISP’s. P2P systems form an overlay network of peers oblivious of the underlying IP network topology. This results in data dissemination amongst P2P peers such that they may contradict the traffic engineering policies of the underlying provider IP networks leading to selection of more expensive routes, endangering peering policies between ISPs etc. The P4P [126]

group is working to investigate methods for the beneficial co-existence of P2P networks and ISPs. One possible solution is to develop P2P mechanisms that are aware of the underlying topology and the location of peers [182]. An oracle mechanism wherein the ISPs assist the P2P networks in selecting peers has been described in [1].

P2P as a technology is extremely potent to serve as the next generation content delivery mechanism, mostly because of its scalability, resilience, self-configuration and self-healing properties. Research groups, such as P2P-Next [127], are working towards solutions for topology-aware P2P, carrying legal and licensed content for media channels such as IPTV, Video on demand, etc. We think, these research initiatives are important to properly guide the evolution of P2P systems into alleviating the huge data dissemination needs of the future Internet.

4.3. *Swarming Architecture*

A data dissemination architecture for the future Internet based on some established techniques of the P2P world is proposed in [179]. A “swarm” (as used in the context of P2P systems) is a set of loosely connected hosts that act in a selfish and highly decentralized manner to provide local and system level robustness through active adaptation. BitTorrent is an extremely successful “swarming” P2P system. BitTorrent solves the traditional P2P problems of “leeching” (clients downloading files and not sharing it with other peers) and low upload capacity of peers. To counter leeching, Bittorrent employs a tit-for-tat mechanism wherein the download speed of a peer is dependant on quantity of data it shares. Also, Bittorrent implements a multi-point to point mechanism wherein a file is downloaded in pieces from multiple location thus leveraging the fact that the download capacity of a peer is generally much higher than the upload capacity.

Although Bittorrent solves the problem of flash crowds (sudden high popularity of a content) through its swarming model, it does not have good support for a post-popularity download when only a few seeds for the content may exist and the demand for the content is not very high. Also, Bittorrent uses a centralized architecture for its tracker and, hence, introduces a single point of failure. Thus, in scenarios like that of a delay tolerant networks (DTN), if the tracker is unreachable from the peer, the peer cannot download data even though all the

peers uploading the file may be within communication reach of the DTN peer. The mechanisms introduced to counter this situation are to use replicated trackers or Distributed Hash Tree (DHT) tracking mechanisms. However, replicated trackers result in un-unified swarms (multiple swarms for a single file) while DHT mechanisms introduce additional latency and burden on the peers.

Despite some of these drawbacks, Bittorrent, as of 2004, was reported to be carrying one third of the total Internet traffic [121, 174]. Motivated by the huge success of swarming systems like Bittorrent, [179] proposes to investigate the feasibility of a swarming architecture, named *uswarm*, as the basis for content delivery in the future Internet. Some of the key modifications needed to define an architecture based on swarming, rather than an isolated service are: (1) A generic naming and resolution service, (2) A massively distributed tracking system, (3) Economic and social incentive model, and (4) support for in-network caches to be a part of the swarm architecture.

To be the basis for content distribution architecture, *uswarm* needs to devise a generic naming and resolution mechanism. The objective of this mechanism, called the Intent Resolution Service or IRS, is to translate intent specified in an application specific form, such as URL, CSS etc., to a standardized meta-data and resolving the meta-data (Meta-data Resolution Service or MRS) to a set of peers that can serve the data. The MRS service is devised using a combination of: (1) Highly replicated tracking using logically centralized tracking system like the DNS, (2) in-network tracking where a gateway may intercept the request and process it, and (3) peer-to-peer tracking using peer-to-peer gossip mechanisms as in KaZaa[128], Gnutella[129] etc. All these tracking mechanisms are highly distributed and are expected to significantly improve the availability of the system.

Uswarm is an unified swarming model. Unlike Bittorrent-like models where each file is associated with its own swarm, *uswarm* advocates a unified swarm. In an unified swarm, peers are not connected loosely together based on a particular content, but they are all part of the system and help each other attain their objectives. As an example, suppose there are two files, A and B, each with their associated swarm, *A_swarm* and *B_swarm*, respectively. Also suppose that the peers of *B_swarm* already have the file A and similarly the peers of *B_swarm* already have the file A. In such a situa-

tion, A_swarm could contribute to B_swarm by providing a pre-formed swarm for file B and similarly B_swarm could contribute to A_swarm.

The co-operative swarming mechanism requires some fundamental extensions to Bittorrent-like incentive mechanisms. Uswarm uses the same “tit-for-tat” principal of the Bittorrent incentive mechanism but extends it to provide incentive for a peer to upload blocks from multiple files (rather than only the file that it is presently downloading) to support the co-operative swarming paradigm of uswarm. Also, a control plane incentive mechanism needs to be developed for uswarm since it depends on a distributed peer-to-peer mechanism for control messages for the Meta-data Resolution Service. The control plane incentive mechanism includes (1) tit-for-tat, keeping track of peers that are most helpful for resolving control messages, and (2) dynamic topology adaptation in which peers select their neighbors dynamically based on the how helpful they are.

Thus, uswarm seems to solve some of the problems preventing P2P systems from being the dominant content carrying technology of the future (in Section 5.2). Also, leveraging in-network caches, uswarm addresses some of the concerns of the P2P-ISP tussle and also has some flavors of the content centric networking architecture mechanisms discussed in Section 5.4.

4.4. Content Centric Networking

Content Centric Networking or CCN [58] is a new idea that proposes a paradigm shift from the traditional host centric design of the current Internet to a content centric view of the future Internet. CCN is motivated by the fact that the Internet of today, as was designed around 40 years ago, has lost its relevance in the present context of its use. While designed originally, as a mechanism to share distributed resources (access to a printer attached to a single remote host in the organization), the Internet is used more for content delivery today. Since resource access and data access are fundamentally different with completely different properties, the Internet needs to be re-designed to accommodate the present context.

CCN is based on the observation that it does not really matter (at least a high percentage of the time) where data comes from as long as it is valid, secure and authentic. The idea of CCN is to design a new content distribution mechanism as an overlay above the IP networks, leveraging the low cost

of persistent storage. Data has the property that it is replicable. Also, data may be cached at various points in the network. Popular content dissemination on the current Internet involves millions of unicast copies of the same content to be distributed end-to-end. Though serving duplicate copies of the same content, the routers are neither designed nor have an incentive to cache the content and serve from a local copy whenever a request for the same content is encountered. CCN describes a scenario where the intermediate ISP routers cache content, client content requests are broadcasted in a controlled manner and intermediate nodes that have incentive to serve the content from their caches and receive a request for the content may serve the content from their local storage. The primary motivation for ISPs to deploy CCN is the lost revenue to content delivery networks (CDNs) where they may double up as CDN themselves and provide value added services for their customers above the existing plain packet carrying services.

Thus, CCN has the potential to impact the future Internet design in a considerable way. In-fact its almost Copernican innovation of placing data as the centre of networking is an exciting networking idea. In the next sub-section, we shall discuss DONA, which shares similar views as that of CCN but is fundamentally different in its implementation ideas.

4.5. Data-Oriented Network Architecture

The Data Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) [61] proposes a clean-slate architectural idea similar to CCN. Both, DONA and CCN, advocate a paradigm shift from the present host centric architecture of the Internet to a data centric architecture. However, while CCN proposes a network-wide caching mechanism at various network nodes, leveraging the dipping cost of persistent storage, and thus defining an efficient content dissemination system as an overlay over the present IP networks, DONA emphasizes a novel mechanism for naming of content and name resolution to build an architecture around service and data access.

The three most desirable properties for data and service access are: (1) Persistence – the name of a service or data object remains valid as long as the service or data is available, (2) Availability – data or service should have a high degree of reliability and acceptable latency, and (3) Authenticity – data can be verified to have come from a particular source. Unfortunately, in the present host centric design

of the Internet, these three basic requirements of data and service access are not provided naturally. The current design defines mechanisms to access particular hosts and, thus, implicitly limits data to a host. DONA proposes a novel mechanism of explicitly naming data or service and routing on these names for data or service access.

The key mechanism in DONA involves explicitly naming of data or service around a “principal”, where a principal is the owner/creator of the data or service. The names are of the form P:L, where “P” is the cryptographic hash of the principals public key and “L” is a label for the data/service chosen by the principal. The next step of mapping a the data/service name to a location is undertaken through a routing on name mechanism. The routing structure is composed of entities called “routing handlers” or RH’s which are responsible for routing data names (P:L) to particular data servers. A data server may be any host that has a copy of the data and is entitled to serve it.

Two basic primitives “FIND” and “REGISTER” are defined. Any host, entitled to serve data P:L may register it with its local RH in the same autonomous system (AS). The local RH advertises it to the RH’s in the neighboring ASs following the AS level routing policies of BGP. A client, seeking access to a data, sends out a FIND (P:L). The FIND message is routed across RH’s, till the nearest copy of the data is found. FIND also initiates a transport level connection. In the case where RH’s cache data, data exchange starts between the client and the RH, else, after the FIND has been resolved to a particular host, a direct IP level exchange between the client and the server is initiated.

Routing has desirable properties of finding the shortest or most optimal path and also routing around failures. Thus, by routing on data names, DONA achieves the same reliability and self healing properties in the context of data access that the current Internet has for host access. Flat cryptographic names associated with principals helps authenticate data validity and data source. Also, the DONA mechanism of late binding of data to the server host achieves persistence of data (data is available as long as it exists) and thus frees its dependency from the persistence of the host.

Unlike other methods of data dissemination (with the exception of CCN) discussed in this section, DONA defines the whole architecture of the future Internet around data delivery. In the DONA context, other mechanisms such as P2P and CDNs

shall be just special cases using the DONA primitives in different ways.

To summarize, in this section, we discussed some of the potential mechanisms that shall contribute to content delivery services in the next generation Internet. Some of these mechanisms such as CDN, even with its extensions may not be considered strictly next generation since they are not clean slate and thus their transition is imminent in the immediate future. However, the benefits of these mechanisms are limited compared to the more ambitious clean-slate ideas of CCN and DONA. P2P mechanisms are already a dominant carrier of content in the current Internet and their incorporation into a systematic architectural design as in uswarm, P2Pnext, and P4P is expected to prepare it for the next generation. However, we believe that content in the Internet cannot be generically classified under a few common attributes and hence more than one of these mechanisms are expected to co-exist and thus reiterating the requirement that the future Internet needs to support diversity even at the core architectural levels.

5. Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networks (DTN) and Related Architectures

Delay/Disruption tolerant networking research is already an active area of research, guided mostly by the DTN working group at the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) [131]. Developed initially as part of an effort to develop Interplanetary Internet (IPN) [130] for deep space communication, it was soon realized that the concepts developed therein could as well be applied to a number of similar contexts in terrestrial networking and was broadly classified as “challenged networks” [24, 33, 34].

A “bundle protocol” has been developed as an “end-to-end message-oriented overlay” [158]. The bundle protocol sits on top of the transport layer (or other) of the underlying network and provides “store-forward” services (through management of persistent storage at intermediary nodes) to the application layer above it, to help cope with intermittent connectivity. It stores and forwards “bundles” that are variable-sized, generally long messages transformed from arbitrarily long application data, to aid in efficient scheduling and utilization of communication opportunities of contacts.

One of the interesting features of DTN networks is that the end-to-end principle is re-defined such

that it is still valid in the context of a DTN environment. Accordingly, the bundle protocol defines the mechanism of “custody transfer”. When an intermediate node ‘N’ (a node in the hop-by-hop path, between source and destination) receives a bundle with custody transfer, and if it accepts custody of the bundle, then it assumes the responsibility for reliable delivery of the bundle. This allows the node that transfers the custody to node N to delete the bundle from its buffer. Such a notion of reliability is relevant in the DTN context as against the end-to-end principle since the source node may not be connected long enough to ensure end-to-end reliability. Recently, there have been criticisms of the bundle protocol about its efficacy in disrupted and error prone networks and can be referred to at [184]. Several other features of the bundle protocol may be obtained in detail from the relevant RFC’s [158, 24, 35, 149, 19].

Another important issue with DTN is routing [59]. Supposedly, “intermittent connectivity” seems to be the only common attribute of all DTN environments. Other than that, DTNs vary greatly on the parameters of delay, error, mobility etc. Moreover, based on the nature of topological dynamicity, they can be re-classified into deterministic and stochastic systems. Various routing protocols specified for DTNs try to address routing in any one of these operating environments.

While routing in deterministic contexts are easier, an “epidemic routing” [148] scheme has been designed for routing in highly random conditions. In epidemic routing, a message received at a given intermediary node is forwarded to all nodes except the one on which the message arrived. Also, a relay based approach may be used in networks with high degree of mobility. In the relay-based approach, if the route to the destination is not available, the node does a “controlled broadcast” of the message to its immediate neighbors. All nodes that receive this packet store it in their memory and enter a relaying mode. In the relaying mode, a node checks whether a routing entry for the destination exist and forwards the packet. If no paths exist and if the buffer at the node is not full, the packet is stored in the node’s buffer replacing any older copies of the packet already in the buffer. There are a plenty of routing protocols for delay-tolerant networks and [189] presents an exhaustive survey of the existing routing protocols and the context within which they are most suitable for operation.

5.1. Next Generation of DTN research

Delay Tolerant Networking was introduced, initially, in the context of deep-space communications. Extensions of the concepts developed therein have been extended to a wide range of networking contexts that have either high-delay or high bit error rate. In this section, we describe four such contexts that employ the methods of DTN, either to enable or to optimize their data communication scenario and also represent ample potential to be an integral part of the next generation networking paradigm.

5.2. Delay/Fault tolerant Mobile Sensor Networks (DFT-MSN)

Classical sensor networking research is generally focused on developing techniques to achieve high data throughput while minimizing power consumption. As a matter of fact, the radio module is one of the significant power consumers on the sensor node. Hence, a lot of energy efficiency mechanisms of sensor networks involve optimized use of the radio resource. A significant gain in power conservation can be achieved by turning the radio to sleep for most of the time, waking it up periodically to receive or send data. Such schemes can benefit from the store and forward methods developed for DTNs to handle communication over intermittently available links. SeNDT[133], DTN/SN[134], ad-hoc seismic array developed at CENS[132] projects are some examples that employ this technique to attain higher power utilization on their sensor nodes.

Apart from DTN techniques to optimize power consumptions, DFT-MSN’s represent actual scenarios where a DTN-like context is experienced. An example of such a scenario with node mobility, intermittent connectivity and delay and fault tolerant networking context of wireless sensor networks is presented in [55]. For such applications, such as environmental pollution monitoring using mobile sensors, conventional sensor network protocols do not suffice since they are designed to optimize throughput versus power consumption while assuming abundant bandwidth and deterministic and controlled connectivity. On the other hand, classical DTN networks represent the context of intermittent and opportunistic connectivity, high delay and error rates, but without much concern for power conservation. DFT-MSN’s, thus, represent a new class of networks that resemble the context of DTN’s with the additional constraints of optimizing power consumption.

A cross layer protocol design for DFT-MSN communication is described in [181]. The idea is to design a data delivery protocol based on two parameters, (1) nodal delivery probability, and (2) message fault tolerance. In the context of a network of sensors with random mobility patterns and hence intermittent delivery opportunities, the nodal delivery probability is a parameter that depends on the history of the node's successful/unsuccessful transmission of data to another node that has a higher probability of forwarding the data towards the sink. Message fault tolerance is achieved by having multiple copies of the message in the buffers of various mobile nodes, thus having a high probability of getting at-least one copy to be eventually forwarded to the sink. To control the level of redundancy a fault tolerance degree (FTD) parameter for the message is calculated each time it is transmitted from one node to the other. FTD is zero when the message first originates and increases (thus losing priority) each time it is transmitted. The FTD serves as the parameter for data queue management at each node thus bounding the level of redundancy. Based on these parameters, the cross layer protocol itself consists of two modes, 1) sleep mode – to conserve power, and 2) work mode. The work mode has two phases: (1) Asynchronous phase, and (2) Synchronous phase.

1. Asynchronous Phase: This is similar to conventional asynchronous phase RTS/CTS (Request to send/Clear to send) handshaking of the IEEE 802.11 protocol where the node wakes up from sleep, contends over the shared channel for a chance to transmit, sends an RTS message, waits for a CTS from the receiver and finally starts transmitting the message in the synchronous mode. In DFT-MSN, the wireless nodes exchange the parameters of nodal delivery probability and available buffer space in the RTS/CTS exchange. These parameters are the basis of the nodes decision process of whether to forward a message at the given opportunity that shall maximize the chances of the message reaching the sink and at the same time keeping redundancy under bounds.
2. Synchronous Phase: In this phase, the data transmission is synchronized and hence there is no contention. After receiving the CTS from multiple nodes in the asynchronous phase, the node selects a subset of nodes fit for data forwarding and accordingly sends out a “sched-

ule” for synchronized data dissemination.

Based on these phases, the protocol can be optimized to achieve a tradeoff between sleep time and link utilization. A simple scheme, proposed in [181], allows the node to sleep for a specific time “T”, determined by two factors: (1) the number of successful transmissions in the last “n” working cycles, and (2) available message buffer, enforcing short sleeping periods if buffer is full. This mechanism allows the nodes of a DFT-MSN to conserve their power and at the same time maximize the utility of communication opportunities.

Many networks of the future should benefit from the research of DFT-MSN as we move towards an energy efficient system design paradigm in all spheres of engineering. The research in this area is still not mature with only a few proposals and application areas defined as yet. However, owing to the context in which it operates, it is certainly going to add value to the efforts of future Internet designs.

5.3. Postcards from the edge: ORBIT

The cache-and-forward paradigm of delay/disruption tolerant network has been proposed by [187], named ORBIT, to be developed as the basis for an independent network level service to accommodate the huge growth in wireless access technologies at the edge of the Internet. The key motivation for the development of an ORBIT-like network level service is:

1. Advances in wireless access technologies have spawned a huge growth in the number of wireless devices connected at the edge of the Internet. Most of these devices are mobile leading to intermittent connectivity due to factors such as failure of the radio path, contention for access etc. The original Internet was designed under the assumption of persistent end-to-end connected hosts and, thus, the TCP/IP protocols fail to accommodate such an operating environment.
2. Original routers were designed when storage at routers was expensive. The diminishing cost of memory makes architectures like store-forward (requiring persistent storage resources at the routers) more feasible today than before.
3. The future Internet is being designed to allow the coexistence of multiple architectures through virtualization. Thus, it is much easier

for newer paradigms in networking architecture to be defined today, than ever before.

The ORBIT architectural elements consist of wired backbone routers, access routers and mobile nodes. It is assumed that each of these network elements shall have considerable amount of persistent storage. The idea is to develop an architecture based on the store-forward paradigm of DTNs such that every mobile node is bound to a set of “post office” nodes. These post office nodes are responsible for caching the data on behalf of the mobile node during periods of disconnection and opportunistically deliver it when feasible, either directly or through a series of wireless hops.

The design space for the transport layer looks pretty similar to that in classical DTN networks in the sense that they deviate considerably from the end-to-end paradigm of conventional transport protocols of the Internet. Additionally, a naming protocol needs to be specified that maps a node to a set of post-office nodes. The routing protocol, to route packets to a wired cache and forward (CNF) node is similar to the Inter-AS and Intra-AS routing of the current Internet. CNFs belonging to the same AS exchange reachability information among themselves along with detailed path descriptions (link state, preferred modes of data reception etc.) while Inter-AS routing involves exchange of just reachability path vector information.

However, defining an Internet wide store and forward file delivery service has lots of additional challenges. A primary challenge would be that of security, with the file being cached at various nodes in the network. Two conceivable security threats are those of (1) unauthorized access to a file from the cache of an intermediate node, and (2) DoS attacks on network elements by artificially filling up their storage. Also, congestion control mechanisms in ORBIT-like scenario become more important than in DTN scenarios because of the scale of operation of such a network and the finite memory. Another issue that we think might be relevant is that of controlled redundancy. A sound principle needs to be developed to control the number of copies of the file existing at the various intermediate nodes. This would have huge implications on the scalability of the system.

Research efforts, such as ORBIT, are very relevant for the next generation Internet, especially with the emergence of data-centric networking paradigm. Such data-centric network designs could

benefit from ORBIT-like research efforts in defining a Internet-wide efficient caching and delivery system for data.

5.4. Disaster day After Networks (DAN)

A DTN-like challenged network scenario is encountered in disaster-day after networks (after a hurricane or a terrorist attack). An instance of a disaster day after networks (DAN), Phoenix [73], proposes a novel architecture for “survivable networking in disaster scenarios”.

The robustness mechanism built-in into the original Internet was designed for fail-stop robustness, in that it could isolate troubled areas (congested routes, broken links, etc.) and ensure connectivity to the existing parts of the infrastructure. Such fail-stop robustness is not suitable in scenarios where disasters are expected to be of smaller scale, localized, partial or intermittent connectivity, heterogeneous contexts and severely limited resources. The DAN (Day-After Networks) proposal, Phoenix, seeks to define a new architectural framework for providing communication support across diverse, mobile and wireless nodes, intermittently connected to each other, to cooperatively form a rescue and recovery communication service network under challenged conditions.

The two major design requirements for Phoenix are: (1) Role based networking and (2) communication over heterogeneous devices. The networking paradigm in such situations is mostly host-service based rather than being host-host based. Role-based anycast routing mechanisms are best suited, both, for routing efficiency in such challenged conditions and contextual mapping of the services to the available resources. The main objective of Phoenix is to utilize all available resources for communication, power supply, etc. This motivated the design of an architecture that allows the co-existence of multiple heterogeneous communication devices.

Although inspired by the design of Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network (DTN), DAN’s presents a new networking context as opposed to the classical networking contexts of DTNs. Since the topology in a DAN is extremely dynamic, traditional topology based naming of the Internet and DTN [59] routing is not appropriate. Most other classes of DTN’s such as inter-planetary networks and rural connectivity networks have almost exact knowledge about available storage resources and mobility patterns. Such information is not available to DAN’s. Also, being a service-host paradigm and

limited in topological and service diversity, DAN is able to optimize its routing using anycasting. Such role-based methods are generally not employed for traditional DAN's. Apart from these, DAN's also have to (1) deal with a higher degree of diversity in its underlying communication technology, (2) offer better optimizations in the use of redundancy for resilience, (3) better use resources such as storage and communication opportunities, (4) define a more stricter prioritization of traffic to ensure timely dissemination of critical life-saving data, (5) formulate incentive schemes for sharing personal resources for common good, and (6) define security mechanisms to protect against potential abuse of resources, compared to most classical DTN scenarios.

The architectural elements of Phoenix incorporate all available resources ranging from personal wireless devices such as cellular phones, home WLANs, external energy resources such as car batteries, wide-area broadcast channels, dedicated short-range communication systems (DSRC's) etc. They incorporate these resources into one cohesive host-service network and provide an unified communication channel for disaster recovery and rescue operations, till the original infrastructure for communication is re-instated. To achieve this convergence and the stated objectives of DANs in general, Phoenix relies on two underlying communication protocols: (1) The Phoenix Interconnectivity protocol (PIP) and, (2) The Phoenix Transport Protocol (PTP).

1. Phoenix Interconnectivity Protocol (PIP): In a DAN scenario, the communication nodes are expected to be partitioned into a number of temporarily disconnected "clusters" and each cluster comprising of one or more "network segments" using different communication technologies. A multi-interface node supporting multiple access technologies can bridge two or more network segments. Also, node mobility, disaster recovery activities and topology changes may initiate connection between clusters. The PIP layer provides role based routing service between nodes belonging to connected clusters. Each node advertises their specific roles. The forwarding table of PIP maintains entries mapping routes to specific roles and an associated cost metric. Thus, PIP provides an abstract view of a fully connected cluster of nodes to the upper layers while managing all

the heterogeneity of access technologies, role based naming of nodes, and energy efficient neighbor and resource discovery mechanisms within itself.

2. Phoenix Transport Protocol (PTP): DAN operates in an environment of intermittent connectivity, like DTNs. Also, negotiation based control signaling to optimize bandwidth utilization is not possible in such scenarios. Thus, the Phoenix Transport Layer (PTP) is responsible for optimization of storage resources to guarantee eventual delivery of the message. This "store and forward" paradigm of Phoenix is pretty similar to DTNs except that in DANs like Phoenix, storage resources are highly constrained and congestion control issues are more important in DANs than in other types of DTNs. In an attempt to optimize storage resources at forwarding nodes, PTP follows strict prioritization in data forwarding during contact opportunities.

To deliver data between PTP neighbors (logically connected nodes, similar to the concept of neighbors in the end-to-end paradigm) belonging to the same connected cluster, PIP routing may be used. However, for PTP neighbors in disconnected clusters, opportunistic dissemination techniques need to be used. PTP tries to optimize this dissemination process through "selective dissemination" – deciding what data to be given to whom to maximize the eventual delivery probability of the data. However, lack of pre-estimated knowledge about node mobility and capability make it challenging for PTP to optimize selective dissemination. A mechanism of diffusion filters based on exchange of context information (neighbors encountered in a time window, current neighbors, degree of connectivity of nodes etc.) between PTP peers has been suggested as a solution for such situations.

Other architectural considerations of Phoenix include those of security, role management, context sensing and localization, and accounting and anomaly detection issues.

Phoenix is, thus, an instantiation of a more general class of disaster Day After Networks (DAN), that is expected to use established concepts and techniques of DTNs and spawn an important research area for future networking research.

5.5. *Selectively Connected Networking (SCN)*

Most future system designs will need to be energy-efficient. Networking systems are no exception. The original design of the Internet assumed an “always-on” mode for every architectural element of the system –routers, switches, end hosts etc. Sleep-modes defined in modern operating systems are capable preserving the local state of the end-hosts, but not their network states. This incapability can be attributed to the design of the networking protocols. Most protocols implicitly assume the prolonged non-responsiveness from a particular end-host to be signs of a failure and thus discard all associated communication state with the end-host. Obviously, a new paradigm of energy efficient protocol design is required to design energy efficient networking systems.

Methods for developing a “selectively connected” energy efficient network architecture are proposed for study by [2]. Although not particularly similar to DTNs, research in designing selectively connected systems could benefit from the existing ideas in DTN’s, particularly when sleep modes of end hosts render an environment of intermittent connectivity. The key ideas in the design of selectively connected systems are: (1) Delegation of proxy-able state to assistants that help the end system to sleep, (2) Policy specifications by the end system to be able to specify particular events for which it should be woken, (3) defining application primitives allowing the assistant to participate in the application (e.g., peer-to-peer searches) on behalf of the host and wake up the host only when required, and (4) Developing security mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to the systems state from its patterns of communication.

The delegation of proxy-able state to the assistant and also delegating application responsibilities to it on behalf of the host bear some resemblance to the transfer of custody transfer mechanisms of DTN’s. Nonetheless, custody transfer has the implication of defining a paradigm wherein end-to-end principle is not strictly adhered to while it seems that the assistant mechanism simply acts as a proxy for the host for control messages of distributed protocols (thus maintaining selective connectivity) and is authorized to wake up the host whenever actual end-to-end data communication is required. We believe that the design of assistants can be further extended using the concepts of custody transfer and store-and-forward networks such as DTN’s.

6. Network Monitoring and Control Architectures

The Internet is a massive distributed system. The success of the Internet can largely be attributed to the superiority of the distributed algorithms that could handle the scale-up of the Internet from a modest research and academic network to its present global commercial entity. However, with the commercialization of the Internet, vested economic, political and social interests of the multiple ownership network model have added huge complexities to the elegance and simplicity of the distributed algorithms that were not designed under such constraints. Retrofitting policies into the control plane of distributed algorithms made them complex and often led to instabilities. Similarly, the management plane of the Internet was never explicitly designed. Management of a single owner, all trusted network of a few hundred hosts did not pose the requirement of a separate management plane. With the scale-up of the Internet to its current size, management is no longer a trivial task.

Another design weakness of the current Internet is that the management and control plane ride on the data plane. This creates, (1) security concerns wherein any misbehaving or compromised entity may send out unauthorized management or control packets and jeopardize any network function, (2) bootstrapping problem wherein the network cannot self-configure itself, thus depending on manual configurations for initial boot up of the network, and (3) Poor failure mode operation [51] wherein the management protocols are un-available when they are most required - during failures.

In this section we discuss some of the clean-slate architectural ideas that have been proposed to alleviate the above anomalies in the current Internet architecture. Also, some novel proposals aiding network trouble shooting and debugging are also discussed.

6.1. *4D Architecture*

The 4D architecture [135, 186, 50, 153, 51] presents a complete grounds up re-design of the Internet management and control planes. It proposes the paradigm shift from the current “box centric” management and control to a completely centralized solution. The 4D architecture mostly addresses the routing related management issues and those

that apply to management and control within an autonomous system.

Every autonomous system (AS) of the Internet is bound by some common local policies. Most of these policies are related to routing and access related functions. However, such centralized policies have to be translated to “box-level” policies, wherein a box may be a host, internal router, border router or other network entity within the AS. These “box-level” policies have to be deployed individually (and hence a box-centric approach) such that they aggregately implement the network-wide policy of the AS. The disadvantages of such an approach are:

1. Manual configurations at each network entity are error prone and complex. Also, manual configurations do not scale well for large networks.
2. The routing protocols are not designed to comprehend any policy language. The only way to implement a policy is by changing the input parameters (such as local preference, link weights, DER etc) of the protocols to drive a desired output (Forwarding Information Base etc).
3. Changes in network topology (link failure, addition of a router, planned outages) require manual reconfigurations in accordance with the new context.

Apart from these, network trouble shooting, debugging, problem isolation etc are extremely complicated for large enterprise networks. Problems in the data plane cannot be addressed through a management plane (when it is most required) because the management plane typically rides over the data plane itself. Lack of proper interface for cooperation of distributed algorithms, for example between inter-domain and intra-domain routing protocols, lead to instabilities.

Figure 5 further illustrates the motivation behind the 4D architecture. Fig. 5 presents a simple enterprise scenario, wherein AF1 and BF1 are the front office hosts of an enterprise while AD1 and BD1 are the data centers. The enterprise level policy allows front office hosts to access each other (AF1 may access BF1 and vice versa) but allows only local access for the data centers (AF1 can access AD1 and not BD1). To implement this policy, the routers at R1 and R3 place packet filters at the interfaces i1.1 and i3.1 respectively to prevent any non-local

packets to have access to the data centre. Now, suppose a redundant or backup link is added between the routers R1 and R3. Such a small change, requires positioning of additional packet filters at interfaces i1.2 and i3.2 of routers R1 and R3 respectively. However, such packet filters prevent the flow of packets between AF1 and BF1 through R2-R1-R3-R4, in case of failure of the link between R2 and R4, even though a backup route exists.




Figure 5: A Management Mis-configuration Scenario

The four D’s of the 4D architecture are: Data, Discovery, Dissemination and Decision. These four planes are related to each other as shown in Fig. 6 to define a “centralized control” architecture based on “network wide views” (view of the whole network) to be able to dictate “direct control” over the various distributed entities for meeting “network level objectives” of policy enforcements. The individual functions of each plane in the four dimensional structure are as follows:

1. Discovery Plane: Responsible for automatic discovery of the network entities. Involves box level discoveries – router characteristics, neighbor discovery, link layer discovery- link characteristics. The Discovery plane is responsible for creating the “network level views”.
2. Dissemination Plane: Based on the discovery plane data a dissemination channel is created between each network node and the Decision elements.
3. Decision Plane: The centralized decision elements form the decision plane. This plane computes individual network entity state (e.g., routing tables for routers etc.) based on the

view of the whole network topology and network level policies to be enforced.

4. **Data Plane:** The data plane is responsible for handling individual packets and process them according to the state that has been output by the decision plane. This state may be the routing tables, placement of packet filters, tunnel configurations, address translations etc.




Figure 6: 4D Architecture

Thus, the 4D architecture sets up a separate dissemination channel for control and management activities through link layer self discovery mechanisms. This gets rid of the management and control plane bootstrapping problem and makes a basis for auto or self configurable networks. The centralized Decision elements are responsible for implementing dynamic configurations based on topology information and organizational policy inputs. As an example, in the case study presented in Fig. 6, the change in the network topology as a result of the additional link between R1 and R3 is discovered by the discovery plane. The change is communicated to the decision plane through the dissemination channel. The decision plane re-evaluates the configuration of the network and places additional filters to conform to the organizational policies.

The ideas of centralized control and management have been here for some time. [37] suggests a routing architecture wherein the routers act like forwarders while the computation of routing tables is done centrally. Also, the Routing Control Platform (RCP) [20], may be considered to be an implementation of some of the ideas of the 4D architecture.

RCP proposes a similar idea of computing routing tables centrally based on data from border routers and eventually having two RCP enabled sites exchanging inter-domain routing information directly between the RCP servers.

The centralized solution though attractive may have some pitfalls in terms of scalability. An immediate scalability concern with respect to the 4D architecture is the discovery and dissemination plane. The discovery and dissemination plane depends on network wide broadcasts. Broadcast mechanisms are essential for discovery mechanisms that do not depend on manual configuration. However, for large networks, a huge broadcast domain may pose to be bottleneck in performance. In this regard, the 4D architecture may borrow some ideas from [63], which implements an Ethernet architecture using DHT based lookup mechanism instead of network wide flooding.

6.2. Complexity Oblivious Network Management (CONMan)

The CONMan architecture [42] is an extension of the 4D architecture. It re-uses the discovery and dissemination mechanisms of 4D and extends the 4D management channel to accommodate multiple decision elements or Network Managers. Each network manager in CONMan may be associated with particular network management tasks. In this regard, CONMan takes a more general outlook of management than 4D, not restricting it to just routing related management. Also, unlike 4D, CONMan does not present an extreme design point of completely doing away with distributed algorithms such as routing.

The motivations of CONMan are similar to those of 4D. The objectives of CONMan are: (1) Self Configuration, (2) Continual validation, (3) Regular abstraction, and (4) Declarative Specification. Self configuring networks are dynamic, adaptable and also less prone to errors because of reduced human intervention. Continual validation ensures that the networks configuration satisfies the stated objectives. Regular Abstraction requires data plane distributed algorithms to implement a standardized abstract management interface through which they can be managed. Declarative specification is the ability to declare network objectives in high level abstract terms and define an automated method to convert these high-level objectives to low-level implementations.

Based on the objectives stated above, CONMan implements an architecture based on discovery and dissemination planes, module abstractions and pipes. While the discovery and dissemination planes bear close resemblance to that of the 4D architectures, module abstractions are the primitive building blocks that implement a network wide objective. Network wide objectives are modeled as a graph of interconnected modules spread across various nodes in the network. These modules may be data plane modules (TCP,IP etc) or control plane modules (IKE, routing, etc.), on the same network node or different network nodes strung together using pipes. The module abstraction thus model relationships such as dependencies, peering, communication etc. Pipes connect modules and hide the complexity of the mechanisms needed to connect the modules which may vary from inter-process communications, socket based connections etc.




Figure 7: CONMan: Module Abstraction and Dependency Graph

Fig. 7 shows an example of module abstraction and presents a scenario for the implementation of secure IPsec based communication. In the figure, the IP-Sec module delivers data over the IP module which in turn uses the ETH module. The IP-Sec module is also dependant on the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol module to set up end-to-end secure keys for a session. Similarly the IKE module uses the UDP module over the IP module to establish end-to-end keys which it returns to the IP-Sec module. Fig. 7 is a abstract view of the module design in which each module has a switching function that allows it to pass packets between up-pipe (connecting to modules above it in the same node) and down-pipes (connecting to modules below it in the same node). The switching state may be produced locally through the protocol action or may be provided externally through a network manager.

This modular view is very similar to an UML

based system design, defining a system as an aggregation of distributed and interconnected function, differing, however, in the fact that it has been optimized to define highly dynamic systems that require continual validation and re-configuration of the system through a centralized authority. Thus, CONMan takes a less extreme measure than 4D by centralizing the configurability of the network at the granularity of module interactions rather than centralizing the whole control and management plane.

6.3. Maestro

Maestro [32] proposes an operating system like approach for network control and management. In such architecture, network controls are implemented as applications over an operating environment. The operating environment provides support to the network control applications much in the same way an operating system provides support to the applications, by providing services such as, (1) scheduling, (2) synchronization, (3) inter-application communication, and (4) resource multiplexing.

Maestro also proposes a clean-slate architecture and advocates the need to provide clear abstractions and interfaces between protocols, in the same spirit as that of 4D or CONMan. However, unlike 4D or CONMan, Maestro proposes implementing an explicit protection mechanism through defining network-wide invariants in the face of control mechanisms. This provides an extra cushion against any configuration errors, right from high-level configuration description to their lower-level implementation.

A high-level view of the Maestro architecture is shown in Fig. 8. Maestro uses a Meta-Management System (MMS) channel which is similar to the dissemination channel of the 4D architecture. Also, just like the discovery mechanism of 4D, Maestro collects topology and other information of the underlying network over the MMS channel. The operating platform uses this data to construct a virtual view for control applications running on top of it. Each application is provided with the specific and relevant view of the network that it needs to see.

As an example, QoS routing application is not presented with the routers B3, B4, and A4 by the virtual view layer since they are relevant for the QoS routing computations. Similarly, suppose inter-domain policy necessitates the need to prevent B2 from being the egress router for ISPX. To implement such a policy, the virtual view provides a view




Figure 8: Maestro Architecture

to the shortest path routing application devoid of the information that B2 is a border router.

Hence, while the 4D architecture treats the control and management functions as one single monolithic entity, Maestro treats them as an aggregate of multiple functions, with an operating environment and network-level invariants ensuring synchronization among the functions and validating their outputs.

6.4. Autonomic Network Management

In 2001, IBM presented a holistic vision for autonomic computing in which the system as a whole would attain a higher degree of automation than simply the sum of its self-managed parts [136].

Based on this motivation, the Autonomic Network Architecture (ANA) project [137] is a clean-slate meta-architecture for the next generation networks. The key objectives of ANA are similar to those of the self-* properties of an autonomous system stated in [136]. However, pertaining specifically to an autonomic network architecture, ANA motivates a networking architecture composed of self-configuring nodes, self-organizing into a network system through neighbor interactions, with multiple such systems self-federating into a heterogeneous Internetwork. Apart from these, the networking systems should possess the properties of self-protection and self healing.

The ANA framework which allows the co-existence of multiple heterogeneous systems are composed of “compartments”. Compartments are similar to the idea of realms [143], except that

rather than simply managing its own private address space, compartment membership entails being “able, willing and permitted to communicate to each other according to compartment wide policy and protocols”. Every compartment has a hypothetical database that stores the information of each member. Before being able to communicate with any member of the compartment, a resolution process is required to access the database to find the way to access the member. Additionally, addressing is done through local identifiers called labels. To communicate with a remote peer, the sender sends the packet with a local label. This local label identifies and “Information Dispatch Point” (IDP) to which a “channel” is bound. The “channel” is an abstraction of the path setup as a result of the resolution process.

Additionally, functional blocks that are entities like packet processors can be inserted into the data path on demand. Using these, ANA provides multiple mechanisms to do a network operation by runtime selection and switching of protocols. Thus functional composition and monitoring allows ANA to implement its self-* properties.

Although the ANA architecture does not define a specific method for network control and management, we include it in this section since we believe autonomic systems and their self-* properties define a new paradigm of management and control architectures and have the potential to be the basis for the next generation networking architectures..

A holistic framework for autonomic network management based on ubiquitous instrumentation is proposed in [137]. The way protocols are built today, with measurement being just an add-on function, the future network protocols need to be built around a well engineered instrumentation mechanism. Based on data from these measurements, local and global policies and mechanisms for global data sharing, the task of global decision making may be automated depending on centralized or distributed management paradigm.

6.5. In-Network Management (INM)

While ANA is a generic architectural framework for autonomic systems composed of autonomic devices, In-Network Management (INM) [41, 29, 47] proposes a more specific architectural design for embedding management capabilities in all network entities and leveraging the management capabilities that can be achieved as a result of their collaboration . Thus INM advocates a paradigm of

management service composition using several autonomous components. Also, in this regard, INM is quite different from the centralized architectures of 4D, CONMan and Maestro.

In INM, management functionalities are embedded into every network node. Different levels of embedding management capabilities into functional components (device drivers, network protocols etc) are defined: (1) **Inherent**: Management capability inseparable from the logic of the logic of the component (TCP congestion control), (2) **Integrated**: Management capability internal to a functional component but separable from the component logic, and (3) **External**: Management capability located on another node.

Fig. 9 shows a high level view of the INM node architecture. The InNetMgmt Runtime environment is the container in which functional components and In-NetMgmt services can run. The In-NetMgmt Packages, InNetMgmt framework and In-NetMgmt platform are the different levels of abstractions of management function primitives. The InNetMgmt platform provides the most primitive capabilities that can be enabled on a wide set of devices. InNetMgmt framework provides primitive capabilities for a narrower set of devices and the InNetMgmt packages provide technology specific functional add-ons. Functional components are logical entities inside a node that may have their own management capabilities or may be entities that compose a management functionality. The InNetMgmt Services are specific utilities that can be used by management applications. Example such utility is a command mediation service which allows management applications to issue commands and receive responses from the functional components.




Figure 9: INM Architecture

Fig. 10 shows the generic design of a functional component for INM. Functional components may

have their own management modules with a well-defined management interface. The management interface allows functional components to exchange management information. Also, every component needs to have a service interface through which it can expose domain specific functionality and a supervision interface through which the framework may manage and monitor the component.




Figure 10: INM: Functional Component

Having discussed the node architecture and the component architecture, we now present an overall architecture of INM in Fig. 11.

A network administrator can connect using an INM application (point of attachment) connected to the INM kernel. Instead of using a centralized policy server to disseminate and enforce policies on every node, INM allows the policies to be deployed on any node and passed on to others using a P2P mechanism implemented as a component.

We suppose that the INM design would be highly scalable compared to centralized solutions. However, there is some inherent complexity in defining abstract generic interfaces and also in converting network-wide policies into a distributed management state.

To summarize, in this section, we discussed some




Figure 11: INM: Functional Component + Configuration

of the leading proposals for management and control architectures for the next generation Internet. The ideas varied from being extreme design points proposing a completely centralized design in 4D to much milder distributed designs of ANA and INM. Also, it seems that the research community shall have to reach a consensus on whether management and control functionality should be stripped away from protocols and established as a separate service or whether it should still continue to exist as part of protocols. However, there seems to be some unity of thought in the fact that protocols need to implement generic management interfaces through which a network entity may communicate management information and decisions with other entities in the network, be it a central policy server disseminating specific state information or network peers communicating local policy.

7. Services Architecture

The commercial usage of Internet, ubiquitous and heterogeneous environments, new communication abstraction, and security and management challenges require the next generation Internet to provide a broad range of services that go far beyond the simple store-and-forward paradigm of the today's Internet. Research efforts focusing on defining a new service architecture for the next generation Internet are motivated by the following requirements: (1) how the architecture can be flexible and adaptive, (2) how to avoid the ossification of the current Internet, and (3) how to map the user-level service requirements into the lower layers such as infrastructure layer's implementation. FIND projects on service architecture are relatively more technical or detailed, meaning that they try to make the service implementation easier and more flexible, though through different ways: (1) Service-Centric End-to-End Abstractions for Network Architecture: put application function to the routers (service-centric abstraction), (2) SILO: divide into flexible services and methods across the whole networks, and support cross layer, and (3) NetServ: self-virtualized in lower layers, put service to IP layer. In comparison, the EU FP7 projects are more concerned about the relationship among different interested parties and how to setup the service agreement and achieve the service integration from business level to infrastructure level.

7.1. Service-Centric End-to-End Abstractions for Network Architecture

The traditional end-to-end based Internet design puts almost all the service intelligence into the end-hosts or servers, while the network only performs hop-by-hop packet forwarding. The network processing is performed at no higher than the network layer. The network function of packet forwarding was oblivious to the end-to-end service requirements with the network providing a single class best effort service to all end-to-end service flows. This purposeful design is the basis of the simplicity underlying the current Internet architecture and was suitable in the context under which it was designed. However, commercialization of the Internet introduced diverse end-to-end service requirements, requiring more diversified network services. The Service-Centric End-to-End Abstractions for Network Architecture [159] seeks to define a new service architectural framework for the next generation Internet. The idea is to develop the communication abstraction around the transfer of *information* rather than the transfer of *data*. Information is at a higher level of abstraction than data and the basic task of the network should be transferring information rather than just data packets. Packets by themselves are just parts of the representation of information. This new abstraction idea is called Information Transfer and Data Service (ITDS).

The other key idea of this solution is that it utilizes network-process-based routers as infrastructure components. These routers will have to be aware of the application layer service information rendering the network to be an integral part of the service architecture rather than just a store-forward functionality. Fig. 12 and 13 present a comparison of the network stacks between the current Internet and the one with the new ITDS idea.




Figure 12: Layered Internet Architecture[159]

Based on the ITDS abstraction, some example scenarios of the data services are shown in Fig. 14, 15 and 16. A reliable and private communication




Figure 13: Information Transfer and Data Services Architecture [159]

scenario is presented in Fig. 14. It consists of two data services implementing reliability and privacy functionality. The combination of the services can then be applied to the other types of point-to-point information transfer. Fig. 15 presents a scenario of combining a caching service with a reliability service. Different end-hosts then can use the same caching service. This combinational service can be applied to conventional point-to-point caching service. The scenario in Fig. 16 shows a multicast service which could include a large number of end-systems. Moreover, different end-systems can have content trans-coding operation to adapt the presentation of the information to be transferred.




Figure 14: Reliable and Private Communication [159]




Figure 15: Web Caching [159]

In such a framework, it is important to decide where to assign the processing task across the Internet entities. This is also known as the service mapping problem. The service placement across the network is shown in Fig. 17.

The mapping requirements are almost on every layer of the system such as end-to-end layer, router layer, or even port processors layer. However, this mapping problem is known to be NP-complete.

This service architecture basically changes the conventional end-to-end assumption underlying the




Figure 16: Content Distribution and Trans-coding [159]




Figure 17: Service Mapping [159]

current Internet and advocates on putting more functionality into routers, besides their general store-and-forwarding functionality. The architecture requires application layer processing capabilities throughout the network, including the end-systems as well as the routers. Thus, the feasibility of such a requirement of the routers remains to be validated.

Secondly, the service mapping won't be an easy problem, that is to say, deciding how much capacities to invest into general purpose processing and how much for service processing will be an important issue, which requires a good heuristic solution easy and efficient enough for the future. This problem is known to be NP-complete and will be tackled by exploring different heuristics. It is also necessary to consider how different processing functions can be controlled from the point of view of the network as well as the end-system.

7.2. SILO Architecture for Services Integration, Control, and Optimization for the Future Internet

The current Internet is facing the so-called "Balkanization" problem because the new emerging networks and protocols do not necessarily share

the same common goals or purpose as the initial Internet.

The SILO architecture [165] presents a non-layered inter-networking framework. The basic idea is that complex communication tasks can be achieved by dynamically combining a series of elemental functional blocks to form a specific service. That is to say, it can break the general strict layered model and form a more flexible model for constructing new services. Because of this flexibility, it is also easier to do the cross-layer design which is difficult to be done in the current Internet architecture.

The design goals include: (1) Supports for a scalable unified architecture, (2) Cross-service interaction, and (3) Flexible and extensible services integration.




Figure 18: SILO Architecture [165]

In SILO, services are the fundamental building blocks. A *service* is a self-contained function performed on application data such as: “end-to-end flow control”, “in-order packet delivery”, “compression”, and “encryption”. Each service is an atomic function focusing on providing specific function. These small services can be selected to construct a particular task, but the order of these services do not necessary obeys the conventional “layer” sequence and can embrace a much more flexible precedence constraints.

Different from *service*, *method* is an implementation of a service that uses a specific mechanism to realize the functionality associated with the service. An ordered subset of methods within which each method implements a different service is called a *silos*. A silo is a vertical stack of methods and a silo performs a set of transformation on data from the application layer down to the network or infrastructure layer. *Control agent* is the entity inside a node which is in charge of constructing a silo for an application and adjusting service or method pa-

rameters to facilitate the cross-service interaction. In SILO architecture, for each new connection, a silo is built dynamically by the control agent. The basic architecture and their components relationship is shown in Fig. 18. The cloud is the universe of services which consists of services represented by circles. Multiple methods can be used to implement the same service inside every circle. Solid arrow means the sequence constraints of constructing the service. Control agent interacts with all elements and constructs silos according to the precedence.




Figure 19: SILO examples: (a) TCP/IP emulation (b) MPEG video transmission over wireless [165]

From Fig. 19 we can see that one of the biggest advantages of SILO is that it blurs the distinction between core and edge entities, and each network node is free to implement any service. Moreover, the modularity of services, different protocols for the same layer and different implementations of the protocol can be “plugged in and out” easily. Because of this, the fine grained cross layer design naturally becomes very easy and efficient.

However, because the design is significantly different from the current Internet, one of the biggest puzzles is that it is not easy to be validated or implemented. It is also important and difficult to define and identify the appropriate building block services. Moreover, the cross layer design is always related with optimizations, it remains a future research topic for this issue. The control functionality of the system is also important for efficiency. Further control optimization related research may be needed.

7.3. NetSerV: Architecture of a Service-Virtualized Internet

It is well known that the current Internet architecture is resistant against adding new functionality and services to the network core, which is also called “ossification” problem. Adding new network service is not as easy as adding new application to the end-points. Two typical examples are the failure of broad scale implementation of the multicast routing and QoS, and more and more network services are implemented by using overlay network. However, overlay network operate at the application-layer and it is hard to effectively use the resources in the other layers. For example, the overlay networks use their own routing tables and routing algorithms to do the overlay routing.

The NetServ project [84] aims to develop efficient and extensible service architecture in the core network to overcome the ossification. As shown in Fig. 20, it tries to break up the functionalities of the Internet services and makes individual building blocks to construct network services. Each building block is a single unit of network resource or function such as linking monitoring data or routing tables that can further be used or assembled by the upper layer function. This structure can be hosted on any network node such as a router or some dedicated servers. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 21, network service can run over one or more nodes offering the building blocks and the services can run on a “virtualized services” framework which consists of a group of building blocks operating individually.




Figure 20: NetSerV: Transition to a New Internet Service Architecture

The idea of breaking the basic functionalities into building blocks eases the flexibilities of assembling upper-layer services and adding new functionalities into the architecture. However, it also means significant changes to the current layered structure of the network stack. It will also be a challenge to prove




Figure 21: NetSerV: Virtual Service Framework

that the changed model or structure can offer better or similar efficiency and reliability for the current functions such as routing and data delivery. Fundamental changes to the network stack always means risks and also new potential security holes which need further observation and evaluation. Moreover, how to build the building blocks and how to divide them into different group (or how to do the abstraction of the basic functions), and even how to make them interact - all remains to be solved. The protocols and mechanisms for service discovery and service distribution are also important issues.

7.4. SLA@SOI: Empowering the Service Economy with SLA-aware Infrastructures

SLA@SOI means Service Level Agreements (SLAs) within a service-oriented infrastructure (SOI) [166]. Different from the former discussed service architecture research project of FIND which focus more relatively on “singular” network stack modification, the SLA@SOI from EU is more about “multiple” ideas of future Service Oriented Infrastructure. Specifically, its goal is to realize the vision of dynamic service provisioning by a SLA management framework in multi-level environment, i.e., scenarios involving multiple stakeholders and layers of business/IT stack. To realize dynamic service provisioning, there are three challenges that must be addressed:

1. Predictability and dependability of the quality of services
2. SLA management be transparently managed across the whole network
3. Support highly automatic and dynamic negotiation, provision, delivery, and monitoring services.

Thus the main goal of SLA@SOI is to provide an SLA management framework allowing consistent management and specification of SLAs in a multi-level environment. The main innovations include:

1. SLA management framework
2. Adaptive SLA-aware infrastructure
3. Business management and engineering method for predictable system

The SLA@SOI architecture is focused on the service relationship setup and maintenance between customer, service provider, infrastructure provider, and software provider. It is trying to set up a high-level business relationship or framework, business perspective framework to facilitate the service deployment or implementation from business level down to the infrastructure level. Fig. 22 offers a simple overview of the SLA management process. In today's layered system, it is not easy to map user-level SLA into physical infrastructure. Thus, in Fig. 22, we can see that SLA@SOI includes the mapping of higher-level SLA requirement onto lower levels and the aggregation of low-level capabilities to higher levels. The vertical information flow basically reflects the service interdependencies and the originating business context, and support proxy and negotiation process at each layer.




Figure 22: Overview of the Automatic SLA Management Process

The biggest advantage of SLA@SOI is to set up an inter-party service level agreement framework in multi-level environment between different parties such as customer, software provider, service provider, and infrastructure provider. Unlike other research projects in FIND which are more about long term research rather than short term industry need, SLA@SOI provides a more high-level architecture for the service deployment and implementation in real business environment. However, we can also notice that it is not easy to set up a sim-

ple framework and ask all the different parties to obey, and it could take more time and effort beyond the technical aspect to realize this goal. Moreover, the realization of the high-level service level agreement also needs detailed technical support like other FIND projects which are researching to apply the user-level requirements to the infrastructure.

7.5. SOA4All: Service Oriented Architectures for All

SOA4ALL stands for the Service Oriented Architecture for All [168]. SOA4All is endorsed by the Networked European Software and Services Initiative (NESSI) [83].

SOA4ALL aims at providing a comprehensive framework that integrates four complementary and evolutionary technical advances (SOA, context management, web principles, Web 2.0 and semantic technologies) into a coherent and domain independent service delivery platform.

The overall architecture of SOA4ALL includes four parts: SOA4ALL Studio, Distributed Service Bus, SOA4ALL Platform Service, and Business Services (third party Web services and light-weight processes), as shown in Fig. 23.




Figure 23: SOA4ALL Architecture [165]

In the center of the architecture is the SOA4ALL Distributed Service Bus which serves as infrastructure service and core integration platform. The Distributed Service Bus delivers the necessary extension and developments towards a large scale, open, distributed and web-scale computing environment. The SOA4ALL Studio delivers a web-based user front-end that enables the creation, provisioning,

consumption and analysis of the platform services and various third party business services that are published to SOA4ALL. The Studio supports different types of users at different times of interaction. The platform services deliver service discovery, ranking and selection, composition and invocation functionality, respectively. These services are usable as any other published service in the architecture. Their functionalities are used by the Studio to offer client requested functionalities. In Fig. 23, the other parts are business services and processes which are created and processed by the SOA4ALL infrastructure.

SOA4ALL tries to integrate the most recent and advanced technologies into a comprehensive framework and infrastructure to provide an efficient web of billions of services. Research challenges for SOA4ALL include the openness of the future web communities and whether the openness and mobility will pave the way towards a real explosion on the web.

8. Next Generation Routing Architectures

The current state-of-art of Internet routing is marred with numerous problems. The biggest and most immediate concern is that of scalability. With the huge growth in network-able devices participating in the Internet, the routing infrastructure is finding it difficult to provide unique locators to each of these devices (address depletion problem) and the routing nodes are unable to cope with the exponential growth in routing table sizes, number of update messages and churn due to dynamic nature of networks [80]. The basic advantage of packet switched networks in providing higher resilience is hardly implemented in practice. Apart from these, basic services such as mobility, quality of service, multicasting, policy enforcements and security are extremely hard to be realized, if at all. New innovations proposed to mitigate some of the ills have hardly seen any wide-scale deployment. These and other weaknesses of the routing mechanism in the current Internet have resulted in a spur of activity trying to design a better routing architecture for the next generation Internet. While some of the schemes are clean-slate, thus requiring a complete architectural overhaul, others are more incremental that can be implemented over the present underlying system to procure partial benefits. In this section, we discuss some of these proposals that have

the potential to change the routing architecture of the future Internet.

8.1. Algorithmic Foundations for Internet Architecture: Clean Slate Approach

Leveraging the advances in algorithmic theory since the time the current routing model of the Internet was developed, [10] advocates a fresh look at the algorithmic basis of the current routing protocols. A simple example to justify this claim lies in the inability of the current routing protocols to route around congestion. The current routing is based on static load insensitive metric that does not adapt dynamically to avoid congested paths. The proposed solution to this problem led to a “tragedy of the commons” condition wherein all the flows greedily try to route through the least congested path resulting in the routing protocol acting as its own adversary and causing wasteful oscillations of flows across sub-optimal paths. Also, the routing model is based on the assumption of “blind trust” where the routing system is not robust in itself but depends on the absence of intelligent adversaries, huge over-provisioning and manual interventions. Proposals to secure routing assume the presence of trusted anchors for policing and authentication, avoiding the hard condition of compromised trust anchors.

A fundamental requirement to overcome the weakness of the current routing protocols is to define a new routing metric that can dynamically adapt itself to congestions and attacks by a Byzantine insider, provide incentives for selfish users, and guarantee QoS through effective and efficient sharing of heterogeneous resources. The selection of such a dynamic adaptable metric entails changes in the hierarchical IP based path computation methods. A new scalable path computation mechanism, in the lines of flexible peer-to-peer routing architectures, that can be mapped to this underlying metric needs to be determined. Also, the new metric and the path computation mechanism should be able to accommodate the future requirements of content based routing.

A proposed economics-inspired metric with all the desired property is called the “opportunity cost” price function. The idea is to attach a cost to each resource (node memory, node bandwidth, CPU processing, etc.) such that an un-utilized resource is available at “zero” cost, with the cost becoming higher for a higher utilized resource. An

application requiring such a resource needs to justify the cost of the resource against the benefit of acquiring it forming the basis of an effective QoS framework. An application is allowed to specify an arbitrary “benefit” per unit of flow. The QoS admission control and routing is done by finding the shortest path in the opportunity metric and comparing this cost to the benefit of the flow. If the benefit of the flow is more than the opportunity cost of the path, the flow is admitted. This mechanism warrants selfish applications reporting higher benefits to grab more resources for their flows. Such a condition is avoided through an incentive mechanism that assigns a fixed budget of opportunity cost to an application.

Having defined the metric, the routing mechanism needs to be made secure against insider Byzantine attacks. Greedy methods of path selection based on past history fail to counter dynamic adversaries that follow a specific attack pattern matching the greedy path selection. Such adaptive or dynamic adversaries need not be a third party attacker. But the routing system itself, owing to the weakness of its algorithmic basis, acts as its own adaptive adversary under the “tragedy of commons” situation. A simple algorithm to counter such a situation involves the adaptive metric which keeps track of the losses encountered across each edge and selecting a path probabilistically such that the probability of selecting a path grows exponentially with the past losses in that path. To avoid the “tragedy of commons” situation in adaptive routing to counter congested paths, a mechanism wherein the routers artificially suppress the acknowledgements based on a probability dependant on the current congestion condition is devised. These artificial suppression of acknowledgements feed the loss metric view of the network for each flow that try to route along the least cost path over this metric based on a novel flow control mechanism that adaptively re-routes the flows.

The dynamic metric discussed thus far needs to be supported over large network topologies in a scalable manner. The topological hierarchy aids aggregation (and thus scalability) of the current Internet. Such aggregation schemes designed for a static metric become ineffective for a network based on a dynamic metric. Thus, instead of aggregating based on pre-determined fixed identifiers, a new aggregation scheme based on physical location is defined. The proposal is to devise a new locality preserving, peer-to-peer directory service rather than

a fixed infrastructure DNS service.

Thus, a newer algorithmic basis for Internet protocols holds the potential to free the current Internet routing from most of the current constraints that it faces, especially in the routing plane. The contributions of this proposal, if implemented, shall lay the basis of a highly dynamic and hence more robust routing function for the next generation Internet.

8.2. Greedy Routing on Hidden Metrics (GROH Model)

One of the biggest problems with routing in the current Internet is scalability. The scalability problem is not so much due to the large space requirements at routers but is more due to the churn as a result of network dynamics causing table updates, control messages and route recalculations. The problem is expected to exacerbate further with the introduction of IPv6. This problem seems to be unsolvable in the context of the present design of routing protocols, hinting towards the need of some truly disruptive ideas to break this impasse.

The GROH model [64] delivers such an ingenious and disruptive mechanism by proposing a routing architecture devoid of control messages. It is based on the “small world” phenomenon exhibited in Milgram’s social network exercise [81] and later depicted in the famous play “Six Degrees of Separation” [52] in 1990. This experiment demonstrated the effectiveness of greedy routing in a social network scenario and can be established as the basis of routing in the Internet which shows similar scale-free behavior as that of social networks, biological networks, etc. The idea of greedy routing on hidden metrics is based on the proposition that: “Behind every metric space including the Internet there exists a hidden metric space. The observable scale free structure of the network is a consequence of natural network evolution that maximizes the efficiency of greedy routing in this metric space”. The objective of the GROH model is to investigate this proposition to try and define the hidden metric space underlying the Internet topology and develop a greedy routing scheme that maximizes the efficiency of routing in this metric space. Such a greedy routing algorithm belongs to the class of routing algorithms called “compact routing” that are aimed at reducing the routing table size, the node addresses and the routing stretch (the ratio of distance between the source and destination for a

given routing algorithm to that of the actual shortest path distance). However, existing compact routing algorithms do not address the dynamic nature of networks, such as the Internet.

Three metric spaces are being considered initially as part of the investigation to model the Internet's scale-free topology. They are: 1) Normed Spaces, 2) Random Metric Spaces, and 3) Expanding Metrics. Now using a concrete measured topology of some network (in this case, the Internet) 'G' and these metric spaces, their combinations or additional metric spaces as a candidate hidden metric space 'H', a fit of 'G' into 'H' is found. If a fit of 'G' into 'H' is found successfully, two tasks are undertaken, 1) Label size determination – Based on the metric space 'H', labels are assigned to each node such that they facilitate the quick calculation of distance between two nodes, and 2) Label assignment for new nodes – a new node inspects the labels of its neighbors in 'G' and deduces its location in the metric space 'H'. Based on these, the greedy routing algorithm forwards packets to the neighbor that takes the packet more closer towards the destination than any other neighbor. Such knowledge comes at the cost of the node having to maintain the distance of every destination from each of its neighbors. However, no network wide updates are necessary to keep this information and hence avoiding network churn.

An effort towards update-less routing is a promising step towards solving the scalability problem of the Internet. However, it remains to be seen whether such a modeling of the Internet bears feasible and practically usable results.

8.3. HLP: Hybrid Link State Path-Vector Inter-Domain Routing

Border Gateway protocol (BGP) [151] is the de-facto standard for inter-domain routing in the current Internet. However, BGP fails to satisfy the needs of an efficient, scalable, secure, and robust inter-domain routing protocol. Well known problems of BGP route oscillations and instabilities [48, 49, 178, 66, 67, 152], slow convergence [65, 74], blind trust assumptions and lack of support for trouble shooting have inspired research efforts towards a new Inter-domain routing protocol. HLP [170] is a step forward in this direction and claims to be a “clean-sheet redesign of BGP”.

The BGP routing is based on AS (Autonomous System) path vectors and is agnostic to relationships between ASs. This leads to local routing

events being propagated globally affecting the scalability of BGP, and worse still that most of these updates are never used. HLP leverages the inherent peering, customer and provider relationships between ASs to define a hierarchical structure in inter-domain routing. The implicit inter-AS relationships in BGP are explicitly stated in HLP to be able to contain local routing events such as routing updates, security or configuration errors, policy enforcements, etc., within relevant boundaries. Based on this, HLP sets two policy guidelines: (1) Export-rule guideline – Routes advertised by a peer or provider are not advertised to another peer or provider, and (2) Route-Preference Guideline: Prefer routes through customers over routes through peers or providers.

Another fact used by HLP is that prefix-based routing, as in BGP, does not usually result in differing paths than when routing is done at the granularity level of ASs. Nonetheless, routing at the granularity of ASs significantly improves the scalability of the routing system and hence adopted by HLP. Thus, routing at the granularity of ASs and having established a hierarchical ordering of ASs, HLP implements a hybrid link state and path vector routing protocol such that a link state protocol is used as the routing protocol within an AS hierarchy (of provider customer relationships) while path vector is used for routing between these hierarchies. Link state protocol have their advantages of fast convergence and low churn while path vector protocols are more suitable for policy enforcements and scalability. HLP tries to exploit the advantages of both worlds. A high level view of the HLP mechanism as discussed so far, can be seen in Fig. 24

HLP is not a clean-slate or highly innovative design. However, it is a positive step forward from breaking away from numerous incremental changes applied to BGP[151] to re-design an inter-domain routing protocols from grounds up. Thus HLP is a starting point from where newer inter-domain routing protocol ideas may be born.

8.4. eFIT: enabling Future Internet innovations through Transit wire

ISPs and user networks have different purposes and characteristics. ISPs are used as a commodity in the present Internet with the sole purpose to maximize the efficiency of data transport while minimizing their costs. User innovations that do not have immediate positive impact or does not guarantee returns in the foreseeable future are generally




Figure 24: HLP Overview

not appealing to ISPs. On the other hand, user networks are generally the source of data and also the seat of innovations. However, the current Internet design is such that ISP's and user networks share a common address space. Thus, user innovations cannot be isolated to user networks and often they roll over to requiring changes in the ISP networks. This tussle of motivation between user networks and ISPs limits the innovations that can be deployed into the Internet.

eFIT proposes a new routing architecture based on the separation of the transit core from the user networks. Such a separation allows each of these components to evolve independently, and given the difference in their motivations and objectives, this separation allows them to evolve in the proper direction. The idea is to abstract the transit core as a wire connecting the user networks. This wire, called the "Transit Wire", provides a strong universal connectivity between the user networks and evolves with the objective to provide efficient, effective, available, affordable and plentiful data transit service for the user networks. The user networks can thus innovate freely without the concern of having to change any part of the deployed infrastructure of the transit core. A mapping service acts as an intermediary between the two components, mapping user addresses into transit paths and also providing interoperability between diverse mechanisms and protocols used at the two ends of the wire.

The eFIT idea is thus a clean-slate extension of the already existing ideas of edge-core separation for the current Internet. However, while most core edge separation ideas are motivated to alleviate the Internet routing scaling problems, eFIT is motivated by the distinct objectives and separate paths of innovations of these two components.

8.5. ID-Locator split Architectures

Current Internet is faced with many challenges including routing scalability, mobility, multihoming, renumbering, traffic engineering, policy enforcements, and security because of the interplay between the end-to-end design of IP and the vested interests of competing stakeholders which leads to the Internet's growing ossification. The architectural innovations and technologies aimed at solving these problems are set back owing to the difficulty in testing and implementing them in the context of the current Internet. New designs to address the major deficiency or to provide new services cannot easily be implemented other than by step-by-step incremental changes.

One of the underlying reasons is the overloaded semantics of IP addresses. In the current Internet, the IP addresses are used as session identifier in transport protocols such as TCP as well as the locator for routing system. This means that the single IP address space is used as two different namespace for two purposes, which leads to a series of problems. The Internet Activity Board (IAB) workshop on routing and addressing [80] reached a consensus on the scalable routing issue and the overloaded meaning of IP addresses. It urged further discussion and experiments on decoupling the dual meaning of IP addresses in the long-term design of NGI. Currently, there are several proposals for ID-locator split, but most of them cannot provide a complete solution to address all the challenges including naming and addressing, routing, mobility, multihoming, traffic engineering, and security.

One of the most active research groups of IRTF (Internet Research Task Force) is RRG (Routing Research Group) [156], where there is an on-going debate on deciding which way to go among several ID-locator split directions. One possible direction is called "core-edge separation" (or "Strategy A" in Herrin's taxonomy [72]) which tries to keep the de-aggregated IP addresses out of the global routing tables, and the routing steps are divided into two levels: the edge routing based on identifier (ID) and the core routing based on global scalable locators. "Core edge separation" requires no changes to the end hosts. Criticisms to this direction include difficulty in handling mobility and multihoming, and handling the path-MTU problem [72]. In some solutions, the "weird" ID-based routing in the edge also makes some purist believe that it is a short-term patch rather than a long-term solution. Typical solutions include LISP, IVIP, DYNA, SIX/ONE,

APT, TRRP (all from [156]). This “core-edge separation” can be deemed as decoupling the ID from locator in the network side, which is an intuitive and direct idea for the routing scalability issue and relatively easy to deploy, but not good at solving the host mobility, host multihoming, and traffic engineering.

The other direction is called “ID locator split” which requires globally aggregatable locators to be assigned to every host. The IDs are decoupled from locators in the end hosts’ network stacks and the mapping between IDs and locators is done by a separate distributed system. The proposals following this direction handle mobility, multihoming, renumbering, etc well. However, they do require host changes and it may be hard to ensure compatibility with the current applications. Typical solutions include HIP [54], Shim6 [163], I3 [169], and Hi3 [85].

It is seen that these two directions have their own advantages and disadvantages, and it is hard to judge which one is the right for the future Internet. Here we describe two example solutions (HIP and LISP) of these two directions, and after that we discuss our MILSA [140, 141] solution which combines the advantages of these two directions and avoids their disadvantages.

8.5.1. HIP

HIP (Host Identity Protocol) [54] is one of the most important ID locator split schemes which implements the decoupling of ID from locator in end hosts. It has been under development in the HIP working group of IETF for couple of years.

HIP introduces a new public keys based namespace of identifiers which enables some end-to-end security features. The new namespace is called Host Identity (HI) which is presented as 128-bit long value called Host ID Tag (HIT). After the decoupling of HIs from IP addresses, the sockets are bound to HITs instead of IP addresses, and the HITs are translated into IP addresses in the kernel. HIP defines the protocols and architecture for the basic mechanisms for discovering and authenticating bindings between public keys and IP addresses. It explores the consequence of the ID locator split and tries to implement it in the real Internet.

Beside security, mobility and multihoming are also HIP’s design goals and are relatively easier to implement than the “core-edge separation” solutions. HIP supports opportunistic host-to-host IPsec ESP (Encapsulation Security Protocol??),

end-host mobility across IPv4 and IPv6, end-host multi-address multihoming, and application interoperability across IPv4/IPv6.

However, for HIP, although the flat cryptographic based identifier is useful for security, it is not human-understandable and not easy to be used to setup trust relationship and policies among different domains or organizations. It uses the current DNS system to do the mapping from ID to locator which is not capable of deal with the mobility under fast handover situation, and multihoming. Specifically, mobility is achieved in two ways: UPDATE packets and rendezvous servers. First way is simple but it doesn’t support simultaneous movement for both end hosts. Rendezvous servers are better but cannot reflect the organizational structure (realm), and there is no explicit signaling and data separation in the network layer.

Moreover, HIP requires that all the changes happen in the end-hosts which may potentially require significant changes to the current Internet structure and could lead to compatibility issues for the existing protocols and applications.

8.5.2. LISP

LISP (Locator ID Separation Protocol) [70] is another important ID locator split scheme following the “core-edge separation” approach which implements the decoupling of ID from locator in the network side instead of the host side. It is being developed by the LISP working group of IETF.

LISP is a more direct solution for routing scalability issue. LISP uses IP-in-IP packets tunneling and forwarding to split identifiers from locators which eliminates the Provider Independent (PI) addresses usage in the core routing system and thus enables scalability. The tunnel end-point routers keep the ID-to-locators cache and the locator addresses are the IP addresses of the egress tunnel routers. The mapping from ID to aggregatable locators is carried at the border of the network, i.e., the tunnel end-point routers.

LISP enables site multihoming without any changes to the end hosts. The mapping from identifier to RLOC (Routing Locator) is performed by the edge routers. LISP also doesn’t introduce a new namespace. Changes to the routers are only in the edge routers. The high-end site or provider core routers don’t have to be changed. All these characteristics of LISP lead to a rapid deployment with low costs. There is also no centralized ID to locator

mapping database and all the databases can be distributed which enables high mapping data upgrade rates. Since LISP doesn't require all the current miscellaneous end-hosts with different hardware, OS platform and applications, and network technologies to change their current functions, it has the compatibility benefits compared with HIP. The requirements for hardware changes are also small which allows fast product delivery and deployment.

However, LISP uses PI addresses as routable IDs which potentially leads to some problems. In the future, it will be necessary to create economic incentives to not use the PI addresses, or to create an automatic method for renumbering by Provider Aggregatable (PA) addresses.

Obviously, there is a tradeoff between compatibility to the current applications and enabling more powerful functions. Since LISP doesn't introduce any changes to the end-host network stack, by design it cannot support the same level of mobility as HIP. The host multihoming issue is similar. Specifically, from design perspectives, LISP lacks the powerful enough support for host mobility, host multihoming, and traffic engineering. Some researchers argue that LISP is a short-term solution for routing scalability rather than a long-term solution for all the challenges listed in the beginning of this section.

8.5.3. MILSA

MILSA [140, 141] is basically an end-host based ID locator split architecture. MILSA introduces a new ID sublayer into the network layer in the current network stack and uses a separate distributed mapping system to deliver fast and efficient mapping lookup and update across the whole Internet. A new ID space is introduced which combines the features of flat IDs and hierarchical IDs. The new ID space can be used to facilitate the setup and maintenance of the trust relationships, and the policy enforcements among different organizations. Moreover, MILSA implements signaling and data separation to improve the system performance and efficiency. Detailed trust relationship setup and maintenance policies and processes are also presented in MILSA.

Several enhancements to MILSA such as secure hierarchical ID system, multiple ID resolution and mapping, multicast, many-cast, and service integration mechanisms are described in [141].

Although MILSA is basically an end-host ID locator split architecture, it is different from the other ID locator split solutions such as HIP. MILSA tries

to combine the benefits of the two approaches and allows them to coexist and evolve to either directions in the future by providing a hybrid transition mechanism and incremental deployment strategies. Through the combination, the two approaches are integrated into one solution to solve all the problems identified by the IRTF RRG design goals [71] which include mobility, multihoming, routing scalability, traffic engineering, and incremental deployability. It prevents the Provider Independent (PI) address usage for global routing, and implements identifier locator split in the host to provide routing scalability, mobility, multihoming, and traffic engineering. Also the global routing table size can be reduced step by step through our deployment strategy.

8.6. Other Proposals

Several other routing ideas, spanning diverse issues in routing such as user control, simplified management and control, and multipath routing have been proposed. These are discussed in this section.

8.6.1. User Controlled Routes

This [188] is a source routing proposal in which users are allowed to choose the path to destinations. The motivation for this work is similar to other source routing schemes: (1) foster competition among ISP's, and (2) allow more diversity and control to users in path selection. The mechanism involves route maps which are static maps of preferred routes of a user. Unlike traditional path vector mechanisms, route maps are learnt through advertisement about customers and peers initiated at the provider. Also, these advertisements specify costs involved with the paths. The route maps of a user along with their preference are stored in a Name-to-route-lookup service (NRLS). To formulate a route to a destination, the user first needs to obtain the destination's route map and preference and try and intersect the best possible combination with its own route map. While the route maps are static information about AS connectivity, more dynamic link state information using "connectivity maps" are also disseminated. Connectivity maps allows users to update their preferences and route around problem areas. The impact of such a mechanism shall be to support application specific networking paradigms more naturally as part of the architecture.

User controlled routing is still in its nascent stage with no discussion on the analytical concerns regarding engineering and it would be interesting to monitor how it progresses.

8.6.2. Switched Internet Architecture

The “Switched Internet Architecture” [162] proposal advocates a clean slate approach to re-design the Internet by combining the best characteristics of telephony and data. It proposes a new hierarchical addressing scheme along the lines of addressing in cellular and telephone networks. The two-level hierarchy consists of a network ID and a host ID. The network ID is a concatenation of a hierarchical geographical addressing scheme (continent code, country code, state code, area code) with an organization code. Based on this naming scheme, the architecture consists of a hierarchical “bank of switches”, switching packets on predefined digit position in the addressing scheme. The network protocol stack as a result of this simplified switching architecture is reduced to an application layer operating on a port layer (providing port id and data buffering). This port layer operates on the switching layer above the physical substrate.

Though it is true that a simple architecture such as this shall allow many of the management, control, security and QoS concerns to be taken care of, their remain serious questions about dynamicity and ownership of such a network. The growth and success of the Internet to what it is today can be attributed to user demands fostering mutual cooperation among ISPs in a fair competitive environment. Introducing geographical ID into the addressing scheme fosters an implicit relation between all providers in the same geographical area. Also, the Internet model was designed to serve as a highly resilient and dynamic network, which may not be the case if fixed switching state is introduced in the routing plane.

8.6.3. Routing Control Platform (RCP)

RCP [20] has already been discussed (Section 6.1) in the context of the centralized approach towards network management and control. RCP is the extension of the idea presented in [37]. It proposes a centralized routing server (RCP) that computes BGP routes on behalf of the routers in the AS. RCP receives all BGP routing advertisements through iBGP, computes routing tables for each router subject to IGP view and domain policies, and disseminates routing tables to routers. Thus, RCP cen-

tralizes the distributed routing protocol allowing a cleaner and more effective routing management and control. Details of RCP implementation can be found in [77].

As already discussed earlier, policy enforcements in the current routing protocols cannot be enforced through a clean interface. They need to be implemented indirectly through tweaking routing parameters of specific routing protocols and hope for the desired output in routing tables. The increased complexity of routing management subject to the increasing needs of fine-grained policy control clearly suggests that this approach shall not scale in terms of increasing configurational complexity. Proposals such as RCP are thus extremely potent in defining the routing management and control of the future.

In summary, routing is undoubtedly one of the major functions of the network. Since there is a lot of concern about the scalability and security of the Internet routing mechanisms, the future Internet may see a complete paradigm shift. Research in areas of content centric [58] and data centric networks [61]. In similar lines, [143] advocates the necessity of a finer granularity of policy enforcements wherein the user, data, hosts and infrastructure exist as separate entities logically grouped into trust/application domains. Virtualization techniques are touting co-existence of multiple application specific networks locally optimized for their specific purpose or objective. Next generation routing proposals, however, are all designed around the assumption of the present networking environment with added concerns of security, scalability and management. We feel that there is a disparity in the next generation Internet objectives between disruptive next generation architectural ideas with the more conservative routing architects.

9. Future Internet Infrastructure Design for Experimentation

9.1. Background: A retrospect of PlanetLab and others

The fast growth and diversification of the Internet made it extremely difficult to introduce new technologies and protocols backed up with sound experimental validation at realistic size testing environments. PlanetLab [144, 90] was the first effort to design such a testbed facility that would effectively mimic the scale of the Internet by organizing

thousands of Internet nodes, spread out at different geographic locations, under a common control framework. These Internet nodes, offered by various research, educational and industrial organizations, run Linux virtual server software to virtualize its resources, providing isolated resource allocation (called “slivers”) to multiple concurrently active experiments. The node’s virtual servers are managed by a “Node Manager” (NM), which also interacts with a centralized control module called the “PlanetLab Control” or PLC. Experiments are allocated a “slice” which is composed of multiple slivers spanning multiple sites. Such a federated and distributed organization involving node contributors demanding control over the nodes that they own and users running experiments on these nodes, warrant the requirement of a trust based security model that can scale.

To avoid a $N \times N$ blow-up of the trust relationship model, the PLC acts as a trusted intermediary that manages the nodes on behalf of its owners according to a set of policies specified by the owners, creates slices by combining resources from these nodes and manages allocation of “slices” to experimenters. PLC supports two methods of actual slice instantiation at each node, direct and delegated. PLC runs a slice creation service called “pl_conf” at each node. In the direct method, PLC front-end directly interacts with the pl_conf service to create a corresponding virtual machine and allocate resources to it. However, in the “delegated” method, a slice creation agent on behalf of a user contacts the PLC for a “ticket”. This “ticket” encapsulates rights to instantiate a virtual machine at a node and get specified resources allocated to it. The agent then contacts the pl_conf of each node to redeem this ticket and create a slice for the user. Currently, two slice creation services are supported on PlanetLab, PLC implementing the direct method and Emulab implementing the delegated method.

Over time, the PlanetLab design has been extended and modified to provide better and more efficient control and support. One such extension, within the PlanetLab control framework itself is to allow federation of separate and independent PlanetLab instances. Federation of such nature necessitates separate instances of PLC’s to be able to communicate and coordinate with each other through well defined interfaces. It can be easily observed that the PLC conducts two distinct functionalities, node management on behalf of node owners and slice creation on behalf of users, allowing the PLC

to export two distinct interfaces. Also, adopting a hierarchical naming system for slices establishing a hierarchy of slice authorities ease trust and delegation related issues in federation. These extensions combined with added facility at the “pl_conf” to create slices on behalf of multiple slice authorities has lead to the development of regional and private PlanetLab instances that may peer with the “public” PlanetLab instance.

An instance of PlanetLab federation extension is the Planetlab-Europe testbed, supported by the Onelab project [91], which is the European contribution to the world-wide publicly available Planetlab testbed. However, the Onelab project is contributing to enhancing the monitoring infrastructure of Planetlab[155], extending Planetlab to newer contexts such as wireless testbeds [28, 21, 22], adding capability for IPv6 based multihoming of sites [86, 87], dealing with unstable connectivity[78], integrating and mixing emulation tools [23], and providing a framework for network measurements.

PlanetLab being organized as an overlay over IP, it is not necessarily a realistic experimental substrate for network layer protocols. As such, actual routing protocols and router level code cannot be run effectively on a PlanetLab slice. The VINI [92, 13] “running the Internet in a slice” (IIAS) effort was aimed at filling this void by leveraging the existing widely distributed PlanetLab network, user mode linux [30] and advances in open source router code. Fig. 25 presents the PlanetLab VINI slice organization. Router code requires root level kernel access. Thus, running router code directly over a Planetlab slice is not possible. VINI installs User Mode Linux (UML) [93, 30] over the PlanetLab slice and installs open source router coder, XORP[94] over it. UML provides a virtual Linux kernel implementation at the user level. This sets up a distributed set of routers over a PlanetLab slice allowing network level experimentation. However, VINI routers are not directly connected to each other being part of the PlanetLab overlay network. Thus, any network level experimentation is hindered by interfering effect of actual path routers and corresponding routing protocols implemented on them.

Another extension of PlanetLab concerns extending the core mechanism of the overlay hosting facility. Overlay nodes run distributed applications that might involve a lot of packet routing and forwarding functionality. However, traditional overlay




Figure 25: An IAS router on PL-VINI

nodes are simple computers and are not designed for fast routing and forwarding of packets. Turner et al [176] have designed a supercharged PlanetLab platform (SPP) that implements separate slow and fast paths for data processing and forwarding. The slow path is chosen for application specific processing while the fast path is optimized for line-speed packet forwarding and can be used by overlay applications needing large amounts of packet processing and forwarding. The biggest challenge facing the design of such an overlay node is compatibility with existing PlanetLab nodes and hiding the complexities of the node design from experimental code. Thus, SPP introduces a new genre of networking devices designed for optimized overlay hosting.

One drawback for experimental validation over realistic testing environments such as PlanetLab is poor repeatability and lack of experimental control. As an example, a researcher testing a new application optimized to handle intermittent network failures has to wait for the underlying network environment to face such a situation. Also, the nature of failures cannot be controlled and hence it is difficult to test the applications response to a wide range of failure modes. Additionally, the experiments cannot be repeated so that deterministic application behavior can be verified. On the contrary, a simulated testing environment can handle these requirements though not able to mimic the realistic scale and diversity of a realistic testbed. This clear partition of capabilities call for a solution that can leverage the best of both worlds. Emulab[88] is an effort in this direction. Emulab is PlanetLab

extension that accommodates simulated links and nodes within PlanetLab slices. This extension allows researchers access to realistic experiments and at the same time allowing fine grained control and repeatability.

9.2. Next Generation Network Testbeds: Virtualization and Federation

The next generation of network testbed research is primarily focused on virtualization and federation. Virtualization proposes efficient methods for resource sharing by multiple concurrent experiments on the testbeds subject to the constraints of maintaining high degree of isolation, fairness, and security. Federation research looks at the methods to unify multiple diverse testbeds designed to serve diverse experimental contexts and realistic experimental environment.

9.2.1. Federation

Networking testbeds strive to provide a realistic testing and experimentation facility to researchers. The prime goal is to be able to provide a platform that is as close to the production environment as possible. “Federation” helps realize this goal through [138] (1) Providing larger testbed scenarios, (2) Providing a diverse testbed with specialized or diverse resources such as access technologies etc, (3) Creating scientific communities with diverse research backgrounds and inspiring cross discipline research, and, (4) Amortization of costs through more efficient sharing.

However, there exists a lot of challenges that make federation an interesting research problem. These challenges can be categorized into technical challenges and political or socio-economic challenges.

The technical challenges involve problems such as (1) homogenization of diverse contexts to facilitate easy deployment of experiments, (2) fair and efficient sharing of scarce resources, (3) interoperability of security protocols, etc.

The political or social-economic challenges are based more on the implications on economics and organizational policies of sharing such as policies of governments, conflicts between research agencies, conflicts between commercial and non-commercial interests, Intellectual property rights related conflicts, etc.

Thus, the problem of federation of testbeds has different contexts and the solution to a specific sce-

nario for federation varies in accordance to the context. We shall discuss three approaches to federation that are under research currently in the European Network Community.

9.2.2. Virtualization

In spite of the tremendous success of the Internet, it is often made to deliver services that it was not designed for (e.g., mobility, multi-homing, multicasting, anycasting, etc.). However, the IP based one-suite-fits-all model of the Internet does not allow innovative new architectural ideas to be seamlessly incorporated into the architecture. Innovative and disruptive proposals, either never get deployed or are forced to resort to inefficient "round about" means. The huge investments in the deployed infrastructure base of today's networks add to this ossification by preventing newer paradigms of networking from being tested and deployed. Virtualization seems to be the only possible solution to break this current impasse [5].

Turner et al [177] propose a diversified Internet architecture that advocates the ideas of virtualization of the substrate elements (routers etc.) of the network infrastructure. Such an approach would allow researchers to implement and test diverse routing protocols (non-IP based) and service paradigms. The argument is that multiple competing technologies shall be able to co-exist in large scale experimentation and thus the barrier to entry from experimentation to production environments shall be reduced considerably. Such a testbed shall also be free from all intrinsic assumptions that commonly malice the credibility of conventional experimental testbeds.

CABO (Concurrent Architectures are Better than One) [38] is a design of the next generation Internet that allows concurrent architectures to co-exist. The key idea is to de-couple the infrastructure from the infrastructure services. The infrastructure providers in CABO are expected to lease infrastructure entities such as backbone routers, backbone links, switches etc., over which service providers could deploy their own specific protocols and run their own network services optimized to specific service parameters such as quality of service, low latency, real-time support, etc. The infrastructure providers may virtualize their infrastructure substrate and thus allow the isolated co-existence of multiple service providers.

The AKARI Project [95] of Japan also advocates the use of virtualization as the basis of the Internet

architecture in the next generation [53]. As shown in Fig. 26, the AKARI project extends the idea of isolated virtual networks to (1) Transitive virtual networks - cooperation and/or communication between virtual networks, and (2) Overlaid virtual networks: One virtual network over the other.




Figure 26: AKARI: Different Virtualization Models

However, though Internet-scale deployment of virtualization as the basis of the Internet architecture may not be possible in the near future, network testbed designs may immensely benefit from it. The properties of isolation and flexibility of virtualization suit the needs of next generation testbeds that need to be able to support diverse architecture experiments on a shared substrate such that they do not interfere with each other. Also, the feasibility of the core idea of virtualization as the basis of an Internet-scale network can be tested through experiences in deploying testbeds based on virtualization.

Virtualization in Testbed design. The idea of virtualization to isolate network experiments running on shared substrate is not new. However, existing networking testbeds operate on an overlay above the IP based networks, seriously constraining the realism of network level experiments. To overcome this impasse, the future of networking testbeds shall have to be designed for end-to-end isolation, requiring the virtualization of end-hosts, substrate links and substrate nodes.

Turner [175] proposes a GENI substrate design that allows multiple meta-networks to co-exist. Each meta-network consist of a meta-router (a virtualized slice from a router) and meta-links joining the meta networks. The design of substrate routers

that support co-existence of several meta-routers has to cope with the challenges of flexibly allocating bandwidth and generic processing resources among the meta-routers, maintaining isolation properties. The three main components of a router are: (1) line cards – terminate physical links and process packets, (2) switching fabric – transfers data from line cards where they arrive to line cards connected to outgoing links, and (3) control processor – a general purpose microprocessor for control and management functions of the router such as running routing protocols, updating tables at the line cards etc.

A natural design choice of virtualizing such a hardware would be to virtualize the line cards to derive meta line cards. However, this approach fails since the multi-core network processors on these line cards share a common memory causing the meta line cards to interfere with each other. Instead, a “processing pool architecture” is employed in which the processing resources used by the meta routers are separated from the physical link interfaces. As shown in Fig. 27, a set of processing engines (PE) connected to the line cards through a switch. The line cards that terminate the physical links abstain from doing any packet processing and just forward the packets to the PE’s through the switching fabric. A meta-network may use one or more than one PE’s for packet processing. Details of the isolation of the switching fabric and other architectural details can be found in [175].




Figure 27: Architecture of a Programmable Router design

Developing specialized substrate nodes as discussed in [177] shall take considerable amount of

time, effort and research to be developed. Also, such substrates present only in research facilities shall greatly constrain the magnitude and realism of experiments. A shorter-term solution that can allow similar experimentation flexibility over substrate nodes in campus networks is proposed in [96, 79]. To be able to do so, substrate production nodes in campus networks need to provide an open, programmable virtualized environment for researchers to be able to install and run their experiments. However, this approach has two problems. Network administrators shall not be comfortable to allow running experimental code on production routers or switches and commodity router and switch manufacturers are ever reluctant to divulge the technology that sits inside their high-end products, thus providing no chance for virtualization, either software or hardware.

To break this impasse, an open-flow switch has been designed that (1) provides complete isolation of production traffic from experimental traffic thus easing the anxiety of network administrators, and (2) does not require commodity hardware manufacturers to open their internal architecture except for incorporating the Open-flow switch into their hardware. The design of the switch takes advantage of TCAM (Ternary Content-Addressable Memory) based flow tables used mostly by all routers and switches. The idea is to identify incoming packets based on flow parameters (IP addresses, ports, etc.) and take appropriate action as directed in the flow table for a packet belonging to a certain flow. The action can be as simple as forwarding the packet to a particular port (for production traffic) or encapsulating and forwarding the packet to the controller (for the first packet of any flow or for a certain experimental traffic). The exact details of the switch specification is beyond the scope of the current discussion and may be found at [79].

The virtualization techniques discussed in these two schemes are in addition to the various other schemes of virtualization of end systems through virtual machine or virtual server techniques. However, these virtualization techniques do not suffice the needs of wireless environment. The key problems are, (1) **Isolation**: While it is not possible to over-provision the wireless bandwidth, the scarcity of the wireless bandwidth resource forces new partitioning models to be able to support a reasonable number of isolated experiments, and (2) **Uniqueness of nodes**: Wireless signal propagation is a node specific property (coding, multiplexing, etc.)

and difficult to control. Some techniques for virtualization of wireless network elements are discussed in [142]. Some of the techniques for sharing the wireless resource are: (1) **Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA)**: The transmitting frequencies may be partitioned using FDMA, (2) **Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)**: The node is partitioned on the time domain, (3) **Combined TDMA and FDMA**: Virtualize the node by allowing different users to use given frequency partition for a specific period of time, (4) **Frequency Hopping**: Virtualize the node by allowing different users to use different frequency partitions at different time-slots, and (5) **Code Division Multiple Access**: Each user is given a unique and orthogonal code and is allowed to use the entire frequency for the entire time without interference with each other.

Using a combination of these virtualization techniques, a wireless testbed may offer sliceability through (1) **Space Division Multiple Access (SDMA)**: A node with a fixed wireless range is dedicated fully to a user and partitioning is done using spatial separation of multiple nodes in the testbed, (2) **Combined SDMA and TDMA**: The nodes are spatially separated and also each node is partitioned using TDMA creating time slots, (3) **Combined SDMA and FDMA**: the nodes are separated spatially and each node is partitioned using FDMA, creating frequency partitions, and (4) **Combined SDMA, TDMA and FDMA**: The nodes are spatially separated, and each node is partitioned by frequency partitions and each frequency partition is partitioned into time slots.

Thus, virtualization is widely accepted to be the basis for enabling a flexible Internet architecture for the future that would accommodate multiple architectures and allow disruptive innovations and technologies to be easily incorporated into the core architectures. As for the present, testbed designs based on virtualization concepts serve, both as a proof-of-concept for virtualizable Internet architecture of the future as well as a hosting substrate for testing of disruptive technologies for the future.

9.3. Next Generation Network Testbeds: Implementations

The two biggest efforts in this direction are the GENI (Global Environment for Network Innovations)[97] effort in the US and the FIRE (Future Internet Research and Experimentation)[98]

effort in Europe. While the primary GENI objective is to make a dedicated shared substrate facility available for large scale and long-lived experiments, the primary focus of the FIRE project is to federate multiple existing network testbeds in Europe (as a result of prior programs) and provide a large multi-context realistic testbed available for research. In the next two subsections we shall briefly discuss the GENI and FIRE projects limiting our scope to the GENI substrate architecture and FIRE federation efforts.

9.3.1. Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI)

GENI or Global Environment for Network Innovations is an effort by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States to design and implement a novel suite of network infrastructure [44] to allow large scale, long-lived and realistic networking experimentation. GENI shall have its own dedicated backbone link infrastructure through partnerships with the LambdaRail [99] and the Internet2 [100] projects. GENI is also expected to federate with a wide range of other infrastructural facilities to add to its diversity and support for realism. In the rest of this sub-section on GENI, we first discuss the key GENI requirements, the generalized GENI control framework and finally we look into the five different cluster projects, each developing a prototype control framework for GENI underlying the components of the generalized GENI control framework.

GENI Requirements. GENI comprises of a set of hardware components including computer nodes, access links, customizable routers, switches, backbone links, tail links, wireless subnets, etc. Experiments on GENI shall run on a subset of these resources called a “slice”. In general, two types of activities shall be supported over the GENI testbed, (1) deployment of prototype network systems and observing them under real usage, and (2) running controlled experiments. Some of the key requirements for the GENI infrastructure are:

1. **Sliceability:** In order for GENI to be cost-effective and be able to cater to as many experimental requirements as possible, GENI shall need to support massive sharing of resources, at the same time ensuring isolation between experiments.

2. **Programmability:** GENI is a testing-environment needing generality. All GENI components need to be programmable so that researchers are able to implement and deploy their own set of protocols at the component level.
3. **Virtualization and Resource Sharing:** Slieability entails sharing of resources. A common form of resource sharing is through virtualization techniques, wherever possible. However, for some resources, owing to the some inherent properties of the resource (e.g., an UMTS link can support only one active connection at a time), other methods such as time-shared multiplexing etc., may be employed.
4. **Federation:** The GENI suite is expected to be a federated whole of many different parts owned and managed by different organizations. Federation also adds diversity to the underlying resource pool, thus allowing experiments to run closer to real production systems.
5. **Observability:** GENI is an experimental facility. Hence, the GENI design should allow a efficient, flexible, robust and easily specifiable measurement framework.
6. **Security:** GENI is expected to run many disruptive and innovative protocols and algorithms. Also, GENI experiments may be allowed to interact with existing Internet functionality. Hence, security concerns require that GENI nodes cannot harm the production Internet environment, either maliciously or accidentally.

Several other requirements and detailed discussions can be found in the GENI design documents [6, 161, 26, 150, 16, 14, 62]. However, the key value proposition of GENI that separates it from smaller scale or more specific testbeds are:

1. Wide scale deployment – Access not restricted to those who provide backbone resources to GENI.
2. Diverse and extensible set of network technologies
3. Support for real user traffic.

In the rest of this discussion on GENI, we focus specifically on the control architectural framework of GENI and also look at some of the protocol designs that are being undertaken as the first phase of prototype design. ‘

GENI: Generalized Control Framework. Before looking at the specific prototype designs for the GENI generalized control framework in Fig. 28, we need to look at the generic GENI control framework as defined in [45]. GENI consists of several subsystems:

1. **Components and Aggregate Components:** A device which hosts a set of resources is called a component. The resources of a component may be shared through virtualization or other methods among multiple experiments such that they satisfy the properties of programmability, isolation, and security. A set of components under a central control is called an aggregate. A component may belong to one or more such aggregates.
2. **Clearinghouses and Control Framework:** A clearinghouse is a centralized registry that maintains the information for principles, slices, and components. This information in the registries may be used to drive access control policies, control policies, trust mechanisms and federation mechanisms for the components or the aggregates within its scope of control.
3. **Measurement Subsystem:** The measurement sub-system satisfies the “Observability” goal of GENI. It provides a framework for measurement, archival and retrieval of experimental data.
4. **Administration & Operations:** This subsystem provides tools, services, and technical support for enabling and incorporation of new resources into GENI, identifying and managing mis-behaving resources and assisting researchers using GENI.
5. **Experimenter Tools & Services:** This subsystem provides support tools for easy experiment deployment and execution. These tools include functionalities such as resource discovery, resource reservation, designing, composing, debugging, instrumentation, access policies, etc.

Apart from the components discussed above, in GENI control framework, each aggregate has a Aggregate Manager (AM) and every component has a Component Manager (CM). Also, the clearinghouse has a Slice Manager (SM) that can reserve slices for a particular experiment. Also, the control framework defines (1) Interfaces between the entities, (2) Message types, (3) Message flow between entities to realize an experiment, and (4) a control plane for transporting messages between entities.




Figure 28: GENI: Generalised Control Framework and Constituent Subsystems

More details of the control framework of GENI can be found at [45].

GENI Control Framework: Prototype Clusters. The GENI generalized control framework defines a generic meta-architecture with some key named entities to provide a sliceable experimental facility. However, the exact nature of the control activities, the design of the control plane and its implementation is still under active consideration. As such, under the spiral 1 [101], the GENI has set up 5 clusters, with each cluster responsible to implement and deploy a prototype implementation of a control mechanism suitable to be incorporated as the control mechanism of the GENI control framework. These five clusters are: (1) Cluster A – TIAD, (2) Cluster B – Planetlab, (3) Cluster C – ProtoGENI, (4) Cluster D – ORCA, and (5) Cluster E – ORBIT. The discussion is restricted to discussing the control framework design and the federation mechanisms in each cluster prototype development. Ancillary projects within each cluster developing aggregates,

virtualized nodes, etc. are beyond the scope of the current discussion.

Cluster A: Trial Integration Environment with DETER (TIED) Control Framework. The “Cluster A” GENI prototype uses the DETER [102, 15] control framework and designs a federation architecture for the security experiment testbeds anticipating the GENI control framework. DETER is an Emulab based testbed architecture extended to specifically support robust experiment isolation for cyber-security experimentation [103]. Cyber-security experimentations enforce added concerns of security in which an experiment may try to break-free from its isolated environment and attack other experiments, testbed control hardware and also the Internet. Malicious code running as experiments inside the testbed with root access on the nodes can spoof its IP or MAC address. Hence, isolation needs to be implemented right at layer 2 of the protocol stack. DETER handles this through VLAN (Virtual LAN) technology and

switched Ethernet connectivity. The details of the exact architecture of the DETER testbed can be found at [15]. Thus, DETER supports a secure sliceability capability which ensures strict isolation of experiments running on a common substrate [68]. Also, a federation model of DETER with other Emulab [88] based testbeds, such as WAIL [89], can be found at [36].

Federation Architecture: TIED proposes a dynamic federation architecture through a federator module mediating between distributed researchers and distributed, diverse testbed environments. A user is supposed to specify his experimental requirements in some high level constructs which are mapped to experiment topology, resource requirement, etc. by an experiment creation tool. The experiment creation tool may also have as inputs, the specific properties of testbeds in the federated environment. The experiment creation tools finally submit an “experiment representation” to the “Federator”. The federator is responsible to set-up a coherent experiment across resources from multiple testbeds, abstracting the specific control and management heterogeneity from users. A diagrammatic representation of the TIED federation architecture can be seen in Fig. 29. SEER [157] is the Security Experimental Environment for DETER which comprises of various tools integrated to ease the configuration of security experiments by researchers, while DRAGON [104] allows inter-domain dynamic resource allocation across multiple heterogeneous networking technologies. Details of SEER and DRAGON are beyond the scope of the present discussion and an interested reader is encouraged to follow the references to know more about them.




Figure 29: TIED Federation Mechanism

As part of the spiral 1 prototype development effort, TIED undertakes the following activities [46] (1) Development and deployment of TIED component manager and clearinghouse packages, (2) operate a clearinghouse prototype for TIED, (3) Provide GENI users access to TIED testbed. Thus, TIED allows GENI prototype developers to use TIED clearinghouse and component implementations in their own aggregate managers leveraging the TIED federation architecture and also the secure and controlled experimental environment provided for security experiments in DETER.

Cluster B: PlanetLab Control Framework.

“Cluster B” utilizes the Planetlab control framework. While the Planetlab control framework is extended to coalesce with the GENI control framework and realize the GENI design goals of federation and sliceability, the rest of the six projects are involved in designing substrate nodes with diverse capabilities for resource sharing and isolation, and their corresponding component managers.

Planetlab has already been discussed in Section 9.1. The “cluster B” prototype development effort enhances the control framework for Planetlab and extends it to be able to coherently federate all slice based architecture network substrates [145] such as PlanetLab, VINI, Emulab and GENI. The various enhancements are implemented through a GENI wrapper module [146] that bundles an Aggregate Manager, Slice Manager and a Registry into the PlanetLab Control (PLC) and also a Component Manager to individual nodes (nodes in PlanetLab correspond to components of GENI [145]).

The plain Vanilla Planetlab implementation of the GENI wrapper is shown in Fig. 30. Users setup a slice by interacting with the slice manager. The slice manager contacts the registry to get the necessary credentials and then contact the slice manager interface of the Aggregate Manager to create and control the slice. The Aggregate manager communicates to the individual components through the component manager’s slice management interface.

Federation Architecture: Based on the vanilla PlanetLab implementation, federation with other slice based architectures may be architected as follows:

1. Alternative Slice Manager: As shown in Fig. 31 for the case of federation between PlanetLab and Emulab, the Emulab Slice Manager contacts the PlanetLab Registry to retrieve the




Figure 30: Plain Vanilla Implementation of GENI Wrapper

credentials, then it contacts the PlanetLab Aggregate Manager to retrieve a ticket for each slice and finally it redeems those ticket directly with the PlanetLab nodes through the component managers.




Figure 31: PlanetLab Emulab Federation: Alternative Slice Manager

2. Common Registry: As shown in Fig. 32, A common registry is maintained between the federating entities, PlanetLab and Emulab, such that the credentials are commonly maintained at the PLC and Emulab may retrieve these credentials and use it to create and slices purely on Emulab nodes through the Emulab Aggregate Manager.




Figure 32: PlanetLab Emulab Federation: Common Registry

3. Multiple Aggregates: As shown in Fig. 33 for the case of Planetlab and VINI, PlanetLab Slice Manager retrieves credentials from the common registry and may use these credentials to create slices through the Aggregate managers of both PlanetLab as well as VINI. This results in a federation where users are allowed to run their experiments spanning multiple diverse testbeds such that one of the testbeds (in this case VINI) not implementing any Registry or Slice management functionality.




Figure 33: PlanetLab VINI Federation: Multiple Aggregates

4. Full Aggregation: As shown in Fig. 34, full federation involves both the federating parties maintaining their own registries. This allows a “multiple aggregate” scenario wherein each federating party are functionally independent from each other, implementing their own Slice manager, aggregate manager and Registry and users specifically belonging to one testbed may create and control components from both the testbeds.




Figure 34: PlanetLab PlanetLab-Europe Federation: Full Aggregation

Cluster C: ProtoGENI Control Framework.

The control framework in ProtoGENI [105] is an enhanced version of the Emulab control software. The ProtoGENI clearinghouse [106] has been designed to allow it to be shared by all members of the ProtoGENI federation as shown in Fig. 35 and performs the following two functions: (1) Allows

users to find components and (2) Acts as a central point of trust for all members in the federation.




Figure 35: ProtoGENI Control Framework

Federation Architecture: Each member of the ProtoGENI federation is an Emulab installation site and has to have a self generated and self signed root certificate. This certificate becomes the identity of the federate site within ProtoGENI. Thus a “web of trust” is formed between all the members of the federation. A user is provided with an SSL certificate issued by its local Emulab instance which authenticates the user to the entire federation. Certification Revocation Lists (CRL) are sent by each member of the federation to the Clearinghouse, where they are combined and sent out to each member of the federation. The Aggregate Manager of ProtoGENI is implemented by placing the Component Manager API code on top of the Emulab software. Thus, this makes any site running the latest version of Emulab code to join the federation quite easily. It may be noted that the federation concepts of ProtoGENI is in contrast to that of the Planetlab federation concept that allows federation between any two testbeds that implement a slice based architecture.

Cluster D: Open Resource Control Architecture (ORCA) Control Framework. The “cluster D” GENI prototype development plan involves the extension of ORCA (a candidate control framework for GENI) [107] to include the optical resources available in BEN (Breakable Experimental Network). ORCA is a control plane approach to secure and efficient management of heterogeneous resources [108]. ORCA is different from traditional

resource management schemes based on middlewares operating between the host operating system supplying resources and the applications requesting them. ORCA defines a paradigm of resource management wherein the resource management of ORCA runs as an “underware” [25] below the host operating system. ORCA uses virtualization to allocate “containers” over which the resource requestor may install its own environment. Hence, as shown in Fig. 36, the ORCA control plane may be viewed as an “Internet Operating System” supporting a diverse set of user environments on a common set of hardware resources.




Figure 36: ORCA Control Plane

Also, as shown in Fig. 37, the ORCA “underware” control plane allows federation of various heterogeneous underlying resource pools, each with their own set of resource allocation policies.




Figure 37: ORCA Underware

Federation Architecture: The implementa-

tion of federation of diverse resource pools is architected through Shakiro[57] resource leasing architecture based on the SHARP [43] secure resource peering framework. Each SHARP resource has a type with associated attributes and available quantity. As shown in Fig. 38, the site exports a leasing service interface. An application specific service manager may make resource request through the lease API to the broker. The broker matches the requirements and issues tickets for particular resource types, quantity and location. The service manager may then redeem the tickets with the site-leasing service interface which allocates resources and sets them up.




Figure 38: ORCA Federation Mechanism

Cluster E: The ORBIT Control Framework. The “cluster E” GENI prototype is based on the extension of cControl and Management Framework (OMF) [111] of ORBIT to suit the GENI compliant control framework. ORBIT [109, 110] is an unique wireless networking testbed which comprises of (1) A laboratory based wireless network emulator for an initial, reproducible testing environment, and (2) A real-world testbed environment of wireless nodes (mix of 3G and 802.11 wireless access) for field validation of experiments.

The OMF is the control and management framework for ORBIT. As shown in Fig. 39, the user end has an “Experiment Controller” component that is responsible for controlling an user experiment, translating an experiment description to resource requirement and communicating with the resource manager for allocation and control or required resources. The OMF has three primary components: (1) The Aggregate Manager – Responsible for the overall management of the testbed, (2) Resource Manager - Exists on every Resource and

manages various aspects of the resource, and (3) Resource Controller – Communicates with an experiment controller to control the part of the resource committed to an experiment. Finally, a centralized database stores and retrieves experimental measurement data.




Figure 39: ORBIT cControl and Management Framework (OMF)

The OMF is a candidate control framework for GENI and hence the OMF design is being extended to: (1) support multiple heterogeneous hardware, (2) support resource virtualization to support multiple experiments sharing a resource, (3) federate multiple testbeds, and (4) add dynamic steering of experimental control.

Federation Architecture: As part of the Spiral 1 effort, OMF is being extended to support multiple heterogeneous testbeds in accordance with the GENI control framework[112]. Already, OMF has been extended to support mobile testbeds by defining methods to: (1) distribute experiment scripts to mobile nodes, (2) cache experimental measurement data locally on the node in cases of disconnection, and (3) perform experiment actions at predefined points in time experimental. This extension of OMF is aimed to demonstrate the capability of OMF to support multiple heterogeneous testbeds and thus concur to the GENI design requirements.

9.3.2. FIRE Testbeds

The counterpart of the GENI effort in the US is the Future Internet Research and Experimentation (FIRE) effort of the European Union.

A diverse set of testbeds for networking experimentation and testing, in various contexts of access technologies, engineering motivations and layered and cross layered architecture validation, were developed as part of various past research efforts in Europe. The basis of most of this work relates back to the GEANT project [113] which was undertaken to connect 30 National Education and Research

Networks (NREN's), spread across Europe through a multi gigabit network dedicated specifically for research and educational use. The GEANT network thus provides the high bandwidth infrastructure to be shared among various research projects ranging from grid computing to real time collaborative experimentation support. Also, multiple cutting edge network services, such as IPv6, IP with QoS, multicasting, premium IP (prioritized IP based services) etc., have been implemented and are available over GEANT. Hence, GEANT is not a testbed but a production level network infrastructure serving the research community in Europe, much in the spirit of the original NSFNet, LambdaRail [99], CSENET or Internet2 [100] networks in various other parts of the world.

A discussion of GEANT was essential in the present context because the European effort for infrastructure development for the next generation Internet experimentation and testing is mostly focused on efforts towards the federation of diverse individual testbeds over the GEANT infrastructure facility. Federation is defined as “a union comprising a number of partially self-governing regions united by a central federal government under a common set of objectives” [138]. Fig. 40 shows various testbed development research projects that were undertaken as part of the Framework 6 program, most of which are either complete or almost reaching completion [114].




Figure 40: Overview of FP6 Projects

These projects are expected to serve as the foundations for the FIRE facility with the projects such as Onelab 2 [91], Panlab II [115], VITAL++ [116] and WISEBED [117], exploring ideas for the federation of these facilities into a single large experimental facility. Another project, FEDERICA [118],

is aimed at developing an end-to-end isolated experimental facility over dedicated high speed links provisioned over existing educational and research networks. FEDERICA has similar “sliceability” objectives as that of GENI. As shown in Fig. 41, while the other FIRE projects mainly concentrate on federation aiming to support experimentation on a diverse and rich set of underlying technologies, FEDERICA is more of a virtualization proposal aimed at allowing end-to-end disruptive innovations in architecture and protocol design.



Figure 41: Relationship Amongst Various FIRE Projects

In the rest of this section, we shall discuss the virtualization concepts of FEDERICA followed by the federation mechanisms of Onelab 2, PANLAB and PII, and WISEBED.

FEDERICA. FEDERICA [39, 40] connects 12 PoPs (Point of Presence) using high speed (1 Gbps) dedicated circuit infrastructure provisioned via the education and research infrastructure of GEANT2 [119] and NRENs and virtualization techniques to create a “slice” consisting of virtual circuits, virtualizable and programmable switches and routers, virtualizable computing resources. The “slice” is the fundamental unit of allocation for a user’s experimental needs. The substrate just creates the necessary resource configuration and is completely agnostic about the protocol, services and applications running on them. For those users wishing to test a distributed application may request a set of virtual routers and hosts pre-configured with IP and those users wanting to test a novel routing protocol may request a set of virtual hosts and routers interconnected over Ethernet circuits forming a specified topology. In fact, the FEDERICA approach of resource sharing and end-to-end experiment isolation is very similar to the proposals of a diversified Internet architecture discussed in [177, 5].

FEDERICA has four core sites and 8 on-core sites. The core sites are connected into a full mesh topology through high-speed (1 Gbps) GEANT2 infrastructure links. The core allows only direct

dedicated channels between the core switches making the core highly resilient and efficient. The core also allows BGP peering with the global Internet subject to security restrictions. Non-core POP's do not have the strict requirement of direct connection. Hence, non-core POP's can connect to FEDERICA via the GEANT2 infrastructure, via NRENs or via the public Internet. Also there is another group of POP's called collaborative POPs. Collaborative POPs do not provide guaranteed resources to the infrastructure and also they are managed and controlled by their owners.

A major difference between FEDERICA and other similar efforts such as GENI is that, FEDERICA is much more modest in terms of size and diversity. The only objective of FEDERICA is to develop an end-to-end isolated testing environment to be able to support innovative and disruptive network experimentation. As a result, FEDERICA will be available for researchers much sooner than any of the other similar testbed design efforts.

OneLab2. OneLab2 is the current extension of OneLab and has a focus on research using open source tools and softwares. It is primarily non-commercial and hence the primary challenges for federation are technical rather than political. Also, as discussed in [139], an economic incentive based model needs to be developed to increase the resource contribution by each participating site. Resource provisioning in Planetlab currently follows a minimum fixed contribution rule wherein each site needs to contribute atleast 2 nodes to be a part of the system. The allocation policies of Planetlab restrict each site from having at most 10 slices. However, since each slice has unrestricted access to resources irrespective of the number of nodes they contribute to the system, these allocation policies are not economic-centric in the sense that there does not exist enough incentive for a site to provision more resources for the system. To develop effective economic incentive models, wherein allocation is somehow related to contribution, the first step is to develop a metric for evaluating the value of a site through characterization of the resources offered. A suggestion [147] is to characterize resources based on three broad characteristics: (1) Diversity (technology, number of nodes etc), (2) Capacity (CPU, bandwidth, memory etc), and (3) Time (duration, reliability etc).

Federation Mechanism: The present federation policies between Planetlab and Planetlab-

Europe are that of "peering" wherein users from both facilities have the same access rights over the whole infrastructure and both facilities apply the same local policy. However, pairwise federation leads to the common full mesh "n X n" scalability problems, with "n" being the number of federating sites. The problem worsens with plans to have large scale localized federations across heterogeneous networking contexts as discussed in Section 9.2.1. This calls for a hierarchical federation architecture in which an instance of PlanetLab central federates with various regional/local/personal PlanetLab instances which in turn federate with local testbeds [147]. Also, another model of federation could be based on Consumer-Provider relationship in scenarios wherein the users of one local federation form a sub-set of users of a larger federation. Hierarchical federation policies, however, introduce the added concerns of "Local Vs Global Policy" enforcements.

PANLAB and PII (Panlab II). PANLAB is the acronym for Pan European Laboratory and is mostly a consortium of telecom service providers across Europe. It was an effort to federate distributed test laboratories and testbeds across Europe to provide a diverse and heterogeneous facility for large scale networking experiments. It provides a realistic testing environment for novel service concepts, networking technologies and business models prior to their launching into production environments.

Federation Mechanism: The main challenges for the creation of Panlab involve defining an architecture for diverse contextual platforms to be able to federate across a seamless homogenized platform accessible to its users. PANLAB takes an evolutionary approach, moving towards higher degree of automation in the management and control functions of the testbed. Fig. 42 shows the third and final level of this evolution. The three phases of evolution are:

1. **Centralized approach:** This is the first phase. Each partner site shall have to fill up a web form manually detailing the testbed descriptions and resources available for sharing. This form is provided by a web based search services called Teagle. Users wishing to run an experiment submit the nature of the experimental requirements to Teagle. Teagle looks up the repository of testbed meta-data and tries to find a match.

2. **Manual Configuration Approach:** In this phase, the partner sites advertise the testbed meta-data by using a specialized middleware and expose a “Infra-structure as a Service (IaaS)” interface [42]. Teagle will search the repository as well as query this service for required resources. In this phase, resources are virtualized and, hence, the IaaS may hide the actual location of a resource from the user providing infrastructure from one or more partner sites.
3. **On-Demand Configuration approach:** In this final phase of evolution shown in Fig. 42, Teagle will establish an on-demand testbed according to the user requirement by directly interacting with the virtualized resources. Teagle provides a best effort configuration and the users need to directly access the resources for complex configurations.




Figure 42: PANLAB Federation Final Phase: On-Demand Configuration Approach

PANLAB also proposes the use of IMS (Internet Protocol Multi-media Sub-system) to support the control plane of the federation. PII or PANLAB II is an extension of PANLAB and includes a federated testbed of four core innovative clusters and three satellite clusters[115]. PII takes a more holistic view of federation by considering the breadth of technological, social, economical and political considerations of the federation.

9.3.3. WISEBED

The WISEBED project [183] is aimed at federating large-scale wireless sensor testbeds to provide a large, diversified, multi-level infrastructure of

small-scale heterogeneous devices. An Open Federation Alliance (OFA) is defined that develops open standards for accessing and controlling the federation. WISEBED classifies the diverse testbeds into two categories: (1) Fully Integrated: The testbed defines a full range of services as defined by the OFA, and (2) Semi Integrated: Provides sunset of the service defined in the OFA. Another classification based on the access to the testbed also consists of two categories: (1) Fully Accessible: users can access the testbed data and also re-program the testbed devices, and (2) Semi Accessible: Users are only permitted to extract experimental data from the testbed.

Federation Mechanism: As shown in Fig. 43, WISEBED federates multiple wireless sensor node testbeds comprising of a diverse range of hardware and software technologies. The federation mechanism of WISEBED consists of a hierarchy of layers, with each layer comprising of one or more peers. The bottom layer consists of a network of wireless sensor nodes belonging to diverse hardware and software technologies. Each testbed exposes a web based portal through which users may deploy, control and execute experiments. These portal servers form the second layer of the WISEBED federation architecture. The third and final layer is an overlay of the portal servers. Each portal server exposes its services through an identical interface allowing the federation to expose an unified virtual testbed to the users. Each site participating in the federation needs to expose Open Federation Alliance (OFA) standardized interfaces for accessing and controlling the testbed.

Fig. 44 presents a high level view of the portal servers. The portal servers are responsible for the control, management and measurements of a single site. The inner layer consists of services that can communicate with hardware sensor devices through gateways to the wireless networks. User commands are translated into a generic binary packet format that can be understood by the wide and diverse wireless substrate technologies of the testbed. Also, each portal server is connected to one or more, local data stores for storing measurement data. The “outer layer” exposes service interfaces for users to access the testbed through the portal server.

Either these portal servers or a separate overlay node running client services to the portal server in its “inner layer” and exporting portal server interface in its outer layer, run an overlay software to form the federate with other sites. An user re-




Figure 43: Overall Architecture of WISEBED Testbed Federation




Figure 44: WISEBED: High Level view of Portal Servers

quiring o use federated resources may connect using OFA standard web services through the overlay.

10. Conclusions

A number of industry and government funding agencies throughout the world are funding research on architecture for future networks that is “clean-slate” and is not bound by the constraints of the current TCP/IP protocol suite. In this paper, we have provided an overview of several such projects. National Science Foundation (NSF) in the United States started a “Future Internet Design (FIND)” program which has funded a number of architectural studies related to clean-slate solutions for virtualization, high-speed routing, naming, security,

management and control. It also started Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) program that is experimenting with various testbed designs to allow the new architectural ideas to be tested.

Future Internet Research and Experimentation (FIRE) program in Europe is similarly looking at future networks as a part of 7th Framework program of the European Union (FP7). AKARI program in JAPAN is also similar.

In addition to the above, Internet 3.0 is an industry funded program that takes a holistic view of the present security, routing, and naming, problems rather than treating each of them in isolation. Isolate clean slate solutions do not necessarily fit together since their assumptions may not match. Internet 3.0 while clean-slate is also looking at the transition issues to insure that there will be a path from today’s Internet to the next generation Internet.

NSF has realized the need for a coherent architecture to solve many related issues and has recently announced a new program that will encourage combining many separate solutions into complete architectural proposals.

It is to be seen whether the testbeds, which use TCP/IP protocol stacks extensively, being developed today will be able to be used for future Internet architectures which are yet to be developed.

In this paper, we have provided a brief description of numerous research projects and hope that this will be a good starting point for those wanting to do future network research or just to keep abreast of the latest developments.

11. List of Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|--|
| 4D | Data, Discovery, Dissemination and Decision |
| AKARI | ”a small light in the dark pointing to the future” in Japanese |
| ANA | Autonomic Network Architecture |
| AS | Autonomous System |
| ASRG | Anti-Spam Research Group (of IRTF) |

| | | | |
|----------|--|---------|---|
| BGP | Border Gateway protocol | NGI | Next Generation Internet |
| CABO | Concurrent Architectures are Better than One | NGN | Next Generation Network |
| CCN | Content Centric Networking | NSF | National Science Foundation |
| CDN | Content Distribution Network | OMF | ORBIT cOntrol and Management Framework |
| CONMan | Complexity Oblivious Network Management | ORBIT | Open-access Research Testbed |
| CTS | Clear-to-Send | ORCA | Open Resource Control Architecture |
| DAN | Disaster day After Networks | PANLAB | Pan European Laboratory |
| DFT | Delay/Fault Tolerant | PI | Provider Independent |
| DNS | Domain Name System | PIP | Phoenix Interconnectivity Protocol |
| DONA | Data Oriented Network Architecture | PLC | PlanetLab Control |
| DTN | Delay/Disruption Tolerant Network | PONA | Policy Oriented Networking Architecture |
| FEDERICA | Federated E-infrastructure Dedicated to European Researchers Innovating in Computing network Architectures | PTP | Phoenix Transport Protocol |
| FIND | Future Internet Design | RANGI | Routing Architecture for Next Generation Internet |
| FIRE | Future Internet Research and Experimentation | RCP | Routing Control Platform |
| FP6 | 6th Framework Program | RTS | Ready-to-Send |
| FP7 | 7th Framework Program | SANE | Security Architecture for Networked Enterprises |
| GENI | Global Environment for Network Innovations | SCN | Selectively Connected Networking |
| GROH | Greedy Routing on Hidden Metrics | SLA | Service Level Agreement |
| HIP | Host Identity Protocol | SLA@SOI | Service Economy with SLA-aware Infrastructures |
| HLP | Hybrid Link State Path-Vector Inter-Domain Routing | SMTTP | Simple Mail Transfer Prototocol |
| ID | Identifier | SOA | Service Oriented Architecture |
| IIAS | Internet in a slice | SOA4ALL | Service Oriented Architectures for All |
| INM | In-Network Management | SPP | Supercharged PlanetLab Platform |
| IP | Internet Protocol | TIED | Trial Integration Environment with DETER |
| IRTF | Internet Research Task Force | UML | User Mode Linux |
| ISP | Internet Service Provider | WISEBED | Wireless Sensor Network Testbeds |
| LISP | Locator ID Separation Protocol | | |
| MILSA | Mobility and Multihoming supporting Identifier Locator Split Architecture | | |

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