Intrusion Detection



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Audio/Video recordings of this lecture are available at:

http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-14/

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21-1



- 1. Intruders
- 2. Intrusion Detection
- 3. Password Management

These slides are based partly on Lawrie Brown's slides supplied with William Stallings's book "Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice," 6th Ed, 2013.

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Concepts

- Intrusion: Break into, misuse, or exploit a system (against policy)
- Intruders: Insiders or outsiders Most IDS are designed for outsiders
- □ **Vulnerability**: Weakness that could be used by the attacker
- **Threat**: Party that exploits a vulnerability
- Structured Threat: Adversaries with a formal methodology, a financial sponsor, and a defined objective.
- Unstructured Threat: Compromise victims out of intellectual curiosity

Intrusion vs. Extrusion Detection

- Intrusion Detection: Detecting unauthorized activity by inspecting inbound traffic
- Extrusion Detection: Detecting unauthorized activity by inspecting outbound traffic
- **Extrusion**: Insider visiting malicious web site or a Trojan contacting a remote internet relay chat channel

Examples of Intrusion

- Remote root compromise
- Web server defacement
- Guessing / cracking passwords
- Copying viewing sensitive data / databases
- Running a packet sniffer
- Distributing pirated software
- Using an unsecured modem to access net
- □ Impersonating a user to reset password
- Using an unattended workstation

Categories of Intruders

- □ Hackers: Motivated by thrill of access and status
 - > Hacking community a strong meritocracy
 - Status is determined by level of competence
 - Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) -Collect / disseminate vulnerability info / responses
- Criminal Enterprises: Organized groups of hackers
 - > E.g., Eastern European or Russian hackers
 - > Often target credit cards on e-commerce server
- Internal Threat
 - > May be motivated by revenge / entitlement
 - > When employment terminated

Taking customer data when move to competitor Ref: <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_emergency_response_team</u> Washington University in St. Louis CSE571S

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Hacker Behavior Example

- 1. Select target using IP lookup tools
- 2. Map network for accessible services
- 3. Identify potentially vulnerable services
- 4. Brute force (guess) passwords
- 5. Install remote administration tool
- 6. Wait for admin to log on and capture password
- 7. Use password to access remainder of network

Ref: <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hacker_(computer_security)</u>

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Criminal Enterprise Behavior

- 1. Act quickly and precisely to make their activities harder to detect
- 2. Exploit perimeter via vulnerable ports
- 3. Use trojan horses (hidden software) to leave back doors for re-entry
- 4. Use sniffers to capture passwords
- 5. Do not stick around until noticed
- 6. Make few or no mistakes.

Insider Behavior Example

- 1. Create network accounts for themselves and their friends
- 2. Access accounts and applications they wouldn't normally use for their daily jobs
- 3. E-mail former and prospective employers
- 4. Conduct furtive instant-messaging chats
- 5. Visit web sites that cater to disgruntled employees, such as fdcompany.com
- 6. Perform large downloads and file copying
- 7. Access the network during off hours.

Intrusion Techniques

- Often use system / software vulnerabilities
- □ Key goal often is to acquire passwords
 - > So then exercise access rights of owner
- Basic attack methodology
 - Target acquisition and information gathering
 - Initial access
 - Privilege escalation
 - Covering tracks

Password Guessing and Capture

- □ Attacker knows a login (from email/web page etc)
- □ Then attempts to guess password for it
 - Defaults, short passwords, common word searches
 - > User info (variations on names, birthday, phone, common words/interests)
 - > Exhaustively searching all possible passwords
- □ Check by login or against stolen password file
- Another attack involves password capture
 - > Watching over shoulder as password is entered
 - > Using a trojan horse program to collect
 - Monitoring an insecure network login, E.g., FTP

Ref: <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_cracking</u>

Notification Alarms False Positive: Valid traffic causes an alarm False Negative: Invalid traffic does not cause an alarm Probability



Types of IDS

- Signature Based IDS: Search for known attack patterns using pattern matching, heuristics, protocol decode
- □ Rule Based IDS: Violation of security policy
- Anomaly-Based IDS
- Statistical or non-statistical detection
- **Response:**
 - > Passive: Alert the console
 - ▶ Reactive: Stop the intrusion ⇒ Intrusion Prevention System
 ⇒ Blocking

Ref: <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system</u>, <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection</u>

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Sample Signatures

- □ ICMP Floods directed at a single host
- □ Connections of multiple ports using TCP SYN
- □ A single host sweeping a range of nodes using ICMP
- □ A single host sweeping a range of nodes using TCP
- Connections to multiple ports with RPC requests between two nodes

Anomaly Based IDS

- Traffic that deviates from normal, e.g., routing updates from a host
- Statistical Anomaly: sudden changes in traffic characteristics
- Machine Learning: Learn from false positives and negatives
- Data Mining: Develop fuzzy rules to detect attacks

Statistical Anomaly Detection

Threshold detection

- Count occurrences of specific event over time
- > If exceed reasonable value assume intrusion
- > Used alone, it is a crude and ineffective detector

Profile based

- Characterize past behavior of users
- Detect significant deviations from this
- > Profile usually multi-parameter

Audit Records

- □ Fundamental tool for intrusion detection
- □ Native audit records: Part of all common multi-user O/S
- Detection-specific audit records
 - Created specifically to collect wanted info
- □ Audit Record Analysis: Foundation of statistical approaches
- □ Analyze records to get metrics over time
 - Counter, gauge, interval timer, resource use
- Use various tests on these to determine if current behavior is acceptable
 - Mean & standard deviation, multivariate, markov process, time series, operational

Ref: Ktcyeadwantage/isknofprioroknowledge, useden.wikipedia.org/wiki/Audit_trail Washington University in St. Louis CSE571S ©2014 Raj Jain

Rule-Based Intrusion Detection

Rule-based anomaly detection

- Analyze historical audit records to identify usage patterns and auto-generate rules for them
- Rule-based penetration identification
 - > Uses expert systems technology
 - With rules identifying known penetration, weakness patterns, or suspicious behavior
 - Compare audit records or states against rules
 - > Rules usually machine & O/S specific
 - Rules are generated by experts who interview & codify knowledge of security admins
 - > Quality depends on how well this is done

Types of IDS

- □ IDS Sensor: SW/HW to collect and analyze network traffic
- □ Host IDS: Runs on each server or host
- Network IDS: Monitors traffic on the network Network IDS may be part of routers or firewalls



Host vs. Network IDS

IDS Type	Pros	Cons	
Host IDS	Verification of success or	OS/HW dependent	
	failure of an attack pos-		
	sible		
	Specific to a system	Impacts performance of	
		the host	
	Not limited by network	One per host \Rightarrow Expen-	
	bandwidth or encryption	sive	
Network	Protects all hosts	Challenging to see all	
IDS		traffic in a switched en-	
		vironment	
	Independent of OS/HW	Too much traffic to ana-	
		lyze	
	Useful against probes	Not effective against sin-	
	and DoS attacks	gle packet attacks and	
		encrypted traffic	
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Honeypots

- Decoy systems to lure attackers
 - > Away from accessing critical systems
 - > To collect information of their activities
 - > To encourage attacker to stay on system so administrator can respond
- □ Are filled with fabricated information
- Instrumented to collect detailed information on attackers activities
- □ Single or multiple networked systems

Ref: <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honeypot_(computing)</u>

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Password Management

- □ Front-line defense against intruders
- Users supply both:

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- Login determines privileges of that user
- Password to identify them
- Passwords often stored encrypted
 - > Unix uses multiple DES (variant with salt)
 - More recent systems use crypto hash function
- □ Should protect password file on system

Managing Passwords

Education:

- > Give guidelines for good passwords
- Require a mix of upper & lower case letters, numbers, punctuation
- Computer Generated Passwords
 - Not memorisable, so will be written down (sticky label syndrome)
 - > FIPS PUB 181: Random pronounceable syllables
- Reactive Checking: Run offline password guessing tools
- Proactive Checking: Check when users select passwords
 Compare against dictionary of bad passwords
 - Compare against dictionary of bad passwords



- 1. Intruders can be both internal, external or organized
- 2. IDS can be signature based, anomaly based, or statistical Should minimized false positives and false negatives.
- 3. IDS can be host based or network based. Host based is more scalable.
- 4. Honeypots can be used to detect intruders
- 5. Password management requires education and proactive checking