
E-Mail
Security
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http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-09/
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
- MIME
- Security Services: Privacy, authentication, Integrity, Non-Repudiation, Anonymity
- Secure Email Standards: S/MIME, PGP, DKIM, ...
 Spam

Internet Email Overview

- Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP): Protocol to deposit email in another user's mailbox Was originally designed for 7-bit ASCII text messages
- □ Post Office Protocol (PoP):


Protocol to retrieve email from your mailbox Authenticates the user

- □ Internet Mail Access Protocol (IMAP)
- Multipurpose Internet Mail Encoding (MIME): To encode non-text messages



SMTP

- □ Defined in RFC 2821 and RFC 2822
- □ Clients connect to port 25 of SMTP server
- □ It is a push protocol and does not allow to pull
- □ Extended SMTP (ESMTP) is defined in RFC 2821
- □ ESMTP uses EHLO in stead of HELO
- **ESMTP** allows finding the maximum message size
- SMTP-AUTH is an authentication extension to SMTP (RFC 4954)
- □ Allows only authorized users to send email



MIME Example

--unique-boundary-1 Content-Type: multipart/parallel; boundary=unique-boundary-2

--unique-boundary-2 Content-Type: audio/basic Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

... base64-encoded 8000 Hz single-channel u-law-format audio data goes here....

--unique-boundary-2 Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: Base64 ... base64-encoded image data goes here....

Security Services for E-Mail

- □ Privacy: of content
- □ Authentication: of Sender
- □ Integrity: of Content
- Non-repudiation: Sender cannot deny
- Proof of Submission: Proof of sending (Certified mail) – MTA can sign a message digest
- Proof of Delivery: to recipient (return receipt + Content non-repudiation)
- □ Message flow confidentiality

□ Anonymity

Security Services for E-Mail (Cont)

- □ Containment: Keeping messages in a security zone
- Audit: event log
- □ Accounting: Accounting log
- Self Destruct: Receiving mail program will destroy the message
- □ Message Sequence Integrity: in-order delivery

Establishing Keys

- □ 1-to-1
- **D** Public Keys:
 - > Need public key to send an encrypted message
 - > Can sign a message and send a certificate
- □ Secret Keys:
 - Via KDC

Privacy

- □ Employee vs. Employer
- End-to-End Privacy
- □ Use public key to encrypt a secret key
- Same encrypted message can be sent to multiple recipients
- Distribution lists require trusting the exploder

Source Authentication

- Sign a hash of the message with private key (Good for distribution lists also)
- □ Secret Key:
 - > MAC=CBC residue with a random key
 - > Message digest of the random key
 - > Message digest is encrypted with the secret shared key (Same digest for multiple recipients)
 - > Can share a secret key with mail exploder

Message Integrity

- Generally goes with source authentication
 Integrity with source anonymity is meaningless
- □ You can use a shared secret
- Anyone can change the message encrypted or protected with public key

Non-Repudiation

- □ Public Key:
 - > Non-Repudiation: sender signs the message with private key
 - Plausible Deniability: Sender computes a MAC using a random key S and sends [[S]_{Bob Public}]_{Alice Private}
- □ Secret Key:
 - > Non-Repudiation: Notary N. N and receipient share a secret
 - N computes a seal = digest of the message and alice's name using a secret key
 - N shares a secret key with recepient and sends A MAC of the message, seal, and Alice.
 - > A judge could ask N to verify if the seal is valid.

Proof of Delivery

- Delivering MTA or recipient can sign a message digest
- □ Impossible to prove that recipient got the message.
 - If recipient signs it before getting the last part of the message, it may not get complete message but has signed.
 - > If recipient signs after getting the last part of the message, it may not sign but has the message.

Verifying Posting Date

- Preventing Backdating: Notary signs and dates the message
- Preventing Postdating: Notary signs and dates the message along with a fact not known before the date, e.g., newspaper headline, lottery number, ...

Digital Postmarks

- Post office can date stamp your document (Service available in USA and other countries also)
- Client software signs a document and sends it to DPM service
- DPM authenticates the signature, generates a timestamp and signs the resulting package (hash of message, signature, time)
- □ The DPM receipt is sent to the client software and also stored in a non-repudiation database with the message and signature
- The client software wraps the original document and DPM receipt
- Anyone can verify the signature and time
- Original document can be requested from DPM service database
- www.usps.com/electronicpostmark/

Anonymity

- penet.fi allowed two-way communication.
 Assigned code name to sender.
- □ If someone replies they are also assigned a code name
 - > Assigned code name to the source exploder of the replies.
- Message Flow Confidentiality
 - Can send random messages through third party
 - Can use several intermediaries

Anonymous Remailers

- Pseudonymous Remailers: Give a pseudonym to the sender and send.
- Keep a log of pseudonym and actual address => Can be disclosed
- Cypherpunk Remailers: Removes the senders address (no return address) => No log
- Mixmaster Remailers: Anonymous remailer that sends messages in fixed size packets and reorders them to prevent tracing
- Mixminion Remailers: Strongest anonymity. Handle replies, forward anonymity, replay prevention, key rotation, exit policies, integrated directory servers, dummy traffic

Secure Email Standards

- □ Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Not deployed
- □ S/MIME Uses PEM principles
- □ PGP
- □ STARTTLS (SMTP over TLS RFC 2487)
- SMTP-AUTH (SMTP with password authentication)
 DKIM

S/MIME

- □ Secure MIME
- □ Originally developed by RSA Data Security Inc.
- □ Later control passed on to IETF
- □ Can use any certificate
- □ Bob first sends a signed message with a certificate
- □ Alice can then send an encrypted message to Bob
- □ PEM and S/MIME use X.500 names
- S/MIME requires Email as "Alternate Name" in the X.509 certificate
- □ Also, a new component E was added to the X.500 name

S/MIME Example

-----boundarymarker

Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name="smime.p7s"

Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="smime.p7s" Content-Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ABDECDIPAQaAIHGNPAISJPDSFPSDNADNPA -----boundarymarker

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

- □ Used RSA and IDEA (RSA patent in US until 2000)
- V2.6.2 became legal for use within US and can be downloaded from MIT
- A patent-free version using public algorithm has also been developed
- □ Code published as an OCRable book
- □ Open PGP and GNU Privacy Guard
- Uses certificates issued by almost anyone
- Certificates can be registered on public sites, e.g., MIT
- □ hushmail.com is an example of pgp mail service

DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)

- **RFC 4871**
- Sending MTA inserts a signature on behalf of the sender
- Verifying (Receiving) MTA verifies the signature based on public key of the sender

Spam Statistics

- 30 Billion spams per day (June 2005) to 90 billion spams per day (feb 2007)
- □ 80 to 85% of mail is spam
- Most spam originates from USA (19.6%) but 73.58% of spamvertisers are in China.
- Addresses are harvested from web pages, usenet groups, corporate directories
- Spam is sent using botnets, open relays, and open proxies
- Many DNS blackhole list sites were closed down due to DDoS attacks

CAN-SPAM Act of 2003

- **Spamming is a misdemeanor**
- You can send unsolicited commercial email iff
- 1. Unsubscribe compliance
 - > Unsubscribe mechanism
 - > Opt-out honored within 10 days
 - > Opt-out lists used only for compliance
- 2. Content compliance
 - > Accurate from, subject, advertisers address
 - > Identify Adult content
- 3. Sending behavior Compliance
 - Not sent through an open relay
 - Not sent to harvested address
 - Cannot contain false header

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Anti-SPAM:End-User Techniques

- □ Address munging: jain at wustl dot edu
- □ Avoid responding to spam
- □ Use contact forms
- Disable HTML in e-mail: Web bugs (1x1 transparent gifs) can identified who read the mail
- Disposable e-mail addresses
- □ Reporting spam: spam@uce.gov
- **Responding to spam: Overload the advertiser**

Anti-SPAM: Administrator Techniques

- Authentication and Reputation
- Challenge/Response Systems
- Checksum-based filtering: Matching checksum => Spam, hash busters
- Country-based filtering
- DNS Black Lists
- □ Enforcing RFC standards
- □ HELO/EHLO checking: HELO 127.0.0.1 or HELO localhost
- **Greylisting:** Error code 4xx => Retry later
- Fake MX Records: Multiple MX records, spammers do not retry
- Greeting delay: Spammers do not wait

Administrator Techniques (Cont)

- □ Hybrid filtering: Pattern matching and scoring
- Rule-based filtering: more general filtering and scoring
- Statistical content filtering: Learning from user submitted spam/ham
- Reverse DNS checks: Email address domain=IP address domain?
- Sender-supported whitelists and tags: Certified not be spammer
- □ SMTP callback verification: Check return address

Anti-SPAM: Sender ISP Techniques

- Background checks on new users and customers
- □ Confirmed opt-in for mailing list: Removes false submission
- □ Egress spam filtering: Check customer's email addresses
- □ Limit e-mail backscatter: bouncing messages
- Port 25 blocking
- □ Port 25 interception: Rate limit and egress spam filter
- **Rate limiting**
- Monitor Spam reports
- Strong Acceptable Use Policy

Anti-SPAM:Law Enforcement

- Honeypots
- Spamtraps



- UA, MTA, SMTP, PoP, IMAP, Radix-64, MIME
- Encryption is done using secret keys, which are sent using public key encryption
- □ S/MIME and PGP both use certificates
- Spam identification/reduction requires recipient, adminstrators, ISPs, and government actions

Homework 16

- Read chapter 20 complete, and relevant sections of 21, 22 of the textbook
- □ Try answering Exercise 20.4 and 20.7